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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
By titling this article 'Sovereignty in British Legal Doctrine' rather than 'The 
British Doctrine of Sovereignty' I wanted to underline that I am not only going to 
examine the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, genuinely British, but also 
the sovereignty of the people, which is common throughout western juridical 
and political theory. In reality, it is the juxtaposition between both doctrines of 
sovereignty that the following pages revolve around, which also address the link 
between Parliament and Judges or, expressed in a different manner, between 
the law and its judicial control. For that purpose we are going to analyse no less 
than six centuries of doctrinal thought, divided into four stages: the first of them 
extends from the Low Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1688; the second is 
based on one single author, John Locke, and one single book, "The Second 
Treatise on Civil Government", the importance of which for the subject matter 
that is dealt with here was decisive; the third concerns the work of three 18th 
century authors: Hume, Blackstone and Paley; and, finally, the fourth and last 
starts with an analysis of Bentham's doctrine, an author sitting between the 18th 
and 19th centuries, it continues with Austin and ends with Dicey.  
  
British thought on sovereignty was not always linked to the current juridical 
order. Sometimes it took place on the periphery of that order or even against it, 
as it happened with Locke and specially with Bentham. In any case what we are 
interested in is not to examine the way in which the British Juridical order went 
about regulating sovereignty, but only how the doctrine understood this faculty, 
to whom it has been attributed and under what conditions. The references to the 
juridical order or to the institutions that this has created will be, then, those 
essential to understand the doctrinal thinking regarding sovereignty.  
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II. FROM THE LOWER MIDDLE AGES TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 
 
2.1. Bracton and Fortescue  
 
The British Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty surges towards the end of the 
16th century, when it is attributed to Parliament, and not separately to the 
Monarch - as it was happening in Western Europe - the supreme or unlimited 
capacity to approve laws, which is the principal characteristic of sovereignty as 
it was highlighted - as we shall see later - by the creator of that concept, Jean 
Bodin.  
 
That being so, it is then no less true that the doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty has clear medieval origins, as it was in the Middle Ages that the 
supremacy of this institution was affirmed in the juridical creation, although the 
unlimited character of this creation was not totally sustained.  
  
The doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament is, at the same time, intimately 
linked to the medieval idea of the supremacy of the law - the rule of law - by 
virtue of which all public powers, including the King, must submit to the law, 
although at the time what was public and what was private was not clearly 
distinguished.  
  
The submission of the King to the law was proclaimed by Henry de Bracton in 
De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, possibly written between 1272 and 
1277[1] and that McIllwain considers the most important book on Law and 
Constitutionalism in England or any other European Nation[2]. 
  
In this book Bracton established a clear separation between the gubernaculum 
and the jurisdictio, that is, between the sphere of power or control - in the hands 
of the Monarch - and the sphere of the administration of justice, of which the 
Monarch was a part but to which he was, at the same time, subjected[3] 
Bracton recognises on the King of England an absolute freedom to approve and 
modify the juridical rules required to execute the Gubernaculu that received the 
name of leges, constitutiones y assisae, but in exchange he limited the 
jurisdiction of the King in what concerned the lex terrae that could only be 
approved (or simply confirmed) and repealed by the King when he could count 
with the consent of the barons of the kingdom assembled in the Curia Regis, an 
institution that in addition to exercising legislative and executive functions acted 
as the kingdom's Supreme Justice Tribunal[4]  
 
This concept of law, negotiated between the King and his Curia included, in a 
very small way, written rules. This happened, for example, with the Magna 
Carta in 121[5] the most relevant juridical document of the Lower English Middle 
Ages and with which, as Maitland recalls5, English Statute Law commences. It 
was a feudal contract by virtue of which King John committed himself to respect 
the privileges of 'freemen', that is, of noblemen and prelates, compelling himself 
to obtain their consent to the imposition of taxes, to respect their property and to 
faithfully comply with a body of procedural guarantees[6]  
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But the law emanating from the king and his barons was made up, primarily of 
unwritten customs, some very ancient, that the king and his Curia simply 
'confirmed' rather than 'approved'. This is the customary law, or common law, 
that Bracton primarily refers to when he points out in one of the most important 
and best known paragraphs of his book, that it is the law that makes the king 
and not the other way around: Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed 
sub deo et sub lege, quia lex faacit regem[7]  
 
In arguing the subordination of the king to the law - understood above all as 
custom - Bracton formulated a principle common to the whole of Europe that 
stood during the whole of the Middle Ages, despite the reception of Roman Law 
in continental Europe from the 12th century, a reception much less relevant in 
England than in the Continent. As Passerin D'Entreves wrote, "Contrary to the 
roman thesis that the laws and the Law are the creation of a legislature will that 
act consciously and deliberately, whether as the will of a particular ruler or of a 
specific community, medieval doctrine starts from a conception which is the 
exact antithesis of that one. The Law does not owe its existence to a willed act 
of creation but instead is conceived as an aspect of collective life, as custom; 
the legislative act is not a manifestation of a normative will, but a simple written 
record of what is already lived as Law in the use and customs of its men"[8]  
 
Nevertheless it would be as erroneous to reduce medieval law - whether 
English or Continental - to customary law as to reduce our current law to written 
law. Not only because the English king, as it was previously mentioned, could 
dictate written rules, but also because this was the same character shared by 
some laws approved by the king with the acquiescence of his Curia, Surely not 
that many, but as important as the Magna Carta. From the laws approved by 
the king and his Curia would be born the so-called statute law and the common 
law.  
 
Despite that, it is necessary to agree with Passerin D'Entreves that in England 
as much as in Continental Europe, the prevalent law in the Middle Ages was 
customary law, submission to which the king was required to swear before 
acceding to the throne. The Coronation Oath was the name given in England to 
this solemn swearing. The identification of law with custom instead of with 
written law becomes, in addition, of particular relevance to understand the role 
of the monarch as judge more than as legislator, that is, as titular of a function 
closer to the iurisdiction than to legislatio, to that of discoverer and enforcer of 
old law than to that of creator of new law[9]  
 
There is no doubt that 'the rule of law' was perfected in England with the birth of 
Parliament, often dated to 1265 - three years before Bracton's death - when 
Simon of Monfort called the Curis Regis in an unusual way, requiring the 
presence of the representatives of the cities, which until then were not members 
of the Curia. During the second half of the 14th century Parliament was divided 
into two chambers that deliberated separately; that of the Lords, where prelates 
and noblemen sat, and that of the Commons, in which the representatives of 
the cities met. Also during that century and following a slow institutional 
differentiation initiated in the times of the Curis Regis, the King's Council or 
Concilium Regis, managed to extricate itself from the Parliament. That would 
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come to have great significance during the rule of the Tudors and the Stuarts, 
as we shall see later[10]  
 
In two works written between 1470 and 1476, De Laudibus Legum Angliae and 
The Governance of England - notably influenced by the ideas that St Thomas 
Aquinas developed in "De Regimine Principum", one of great masterpieces of 
medieval political thought - Sir John Fortescue argued that while England was a 
dominium politicum regale, France, its secular enemy, was a simple dominium 
regale. What did the most important English political thinker of the 15th century 
wanted to express with that distinction? Simply that in England, contrary to 
France, the Monarch was subject to the law that he himself approved with the 
two Chambers of Parliament, the consent of which was also required to levy 
taxes[11] McIllwain recalls in this respect that for Fortescue the terms politicum 
and regale had a parallel meaning with those of gubernaculum and jurisdiction 
as previously used by Bracton[12] In this way Fortescue established an 
inextricable link between 'the rule of law' and the legislative supremacy of 
Parliament, over which the so-called dual-estate monarchy was based on the 
binomial King/Kingdom, the latter represented by the House of Lords and the 
Commons.  
 
Certainly the dual-estate monarchy had its equivalent in other countries of 
Western Europe, such as France and Spain. In this latter country the Cortes of 
Castille and León were even dated one century before the English 
Parliament[13] However, while in 16th and 17th century France and Spain 
sovereignty was imputed on the King, in England it was attributed to Parliament, 
that is, to the sum or aggregate of the King, the Lords and the Commons. That 
difference in the doctrinal foundation of the Monarchy had its correlation in the 
institutional sphere: while in Spain the Cortes were seldom called to meet 
during these centuries and in France the General Estates no longer met after 
16[14] the Lords and the Commons maintained their political presence during 
this period and despite the undoubted strengthening of the regal power during 
the times of the Tudors and the Stuarts. 
 
2.2. The formulation of parliamentary sovereignty under the Tudors  
 
With the accession of the Tudors to the throne in 1485, a centralising process of 
the Monarchy developed in England similar to that which was taking place in 
Spain, Portugal and France. Just like in those nations, the main impetus of this 
process was the Monarch , strengthened to the detriment of the kingdom, that is, 
of the powers of the two Chambers that represented the kingdom: the Lords 
and the Commons. The Monarch intended and partly achieved to impose his 
law, then under the name of Ordinances and Proclamations - not only side by 
side and even in opposition to the statutes - that is, of the laws approved by 
parliament and sanctioned by the Monarch through 'royal assent' - but also 
against the common law. This last being a law that had itself acted as 
centralising element of the kingdom by superimposing itself on mere local 
juridical custom.  
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In order to carry out the political aims of the State, the King used what during 
the reign of Edward III, the first Tudor King, came to be known as the Privy 
Council. The King appointed at will the members of this Council, heir of the 
Concilium Regis and predecessor of Cabinet. Apart from assisting the Monarch 
and administering justice, the Privy Council made law in the name of the King, 
issuing Ordinances and Proclamations, the content of which varied as it 
covered all branches of the Administration, and eventually forming the body of 
administrative law called ante litteram. The Statute of Proclamations, approved 
in 1539, during the reign of Henry VIII, considerably widen the scope of these 
Proclamations that ranked along those laws approved by Parliament. This 
Statute was, nevertheless, abolished in 1547, during the first year of the reign of 
Edward VI14. In reality it was not easy to determine the juridical nature of the 
'Proclamations' or their originating source within the system. It was generally 
recognised that they were inferior to the laws approved by Parliament and the 
common law, but some writers maintained that the King could suspend of even 
dispense with the application of laws, at least in some circumstances, as we 
shall see later. 
 
One of the committees of the Privy Council was the feared Star Chamber that 
advised the King and exercised judicial functions. Its resolutions also sought to 
impose themselves on the judges of the common law. In addition to the Star 
Chamber - that would not be abolished until 1641 - other judicial organs 
depended from the Privy Council that acted in accordance with Roman Law, 
such as the Court of Request, the Courts of Chancery and Admiralty, and the 
High Commission, an ecclesiastical tribunal. All of them diminished the status of 
common law courts and impeded their expansion [15]  
 
It must also be taken into account that from Henry VIII, English Monarchs - in 
addition to being Kings of England - became the head of the new Anglican 
Church, the break of which from the Roman Catholic Church was the last act in 
a long sequence of religious conflicts between the Crown and the Papacy that 
had their genesis with the Lutheran reform[16] However, it can not be forgotten 
that it was Parliament that legalised the break of the Church of England from 
Rome and named Henry VIII as its head, against the advise of Thomas Moore 
and executed for this reason in 1535. In this manner the English Parliament 
freed itself from cannon law and proclaimed its sovereignty, not just its mere 
legislative supremacy.  
 
In reality and despite the considerable strengthening of regal power during the 
16th century, the sovereignty of Parliament was considered as the main 
equivalent of an English Constitution, perhaps the most substantial of all. This is 
what was argued by Sir Thomas Smith in De Republica Anglorum, a clear and 
concise work published in 1583 - six years after the death of its author - that 
includes the most important description of the English system of government 
during Tudor times. For Smith, Parliament - made up of the King and the two 
Chambers - represented and had the power of the whole of the kingdom, that of 
the mind and the body. In the Parliament, added Smith - advancing the modern 
individualistic idea of parliamentary representation - all Englishmen were 
present, either personally or through representation, so that the consent of 
Parliament was equivalent to the consent of each man[17]  
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Parliament, understood in that way, was the repository of the highest and most 
absolute power of the English Kingdom to which everyone was linked, from the 
King to the most humble of subjects. Parliament - as Smith concluded - 
abrogated old laws, made new ones, gave rulings for things past and those yet 
to come, changed the rights and properties of men, established forms of religion, 
altered weights and measures, provided for rules of succession to the Crown, 
defined doubtful rights in the absence of law, granted subsidies, sizes, rates 
and taxes; granted pardons and absolutions, rehabilitated in blood and name, 
and as supreme tribunal condemned and absolved[18]  
 
Richard Hooker, in the eighth book of his most important work Of the Lawes of 
Ecclesiastical Politie - probably written in the last decade of the 16th century - 
insisted that it was in the English Parliament that the marrow of the government 
within this kingdom could be found. He understood that government was a 
"corporation that represented the whole kingdom" since it was made up of "the 
king and all his subjects", and that these, as it had been held by Smith, were 
understood to be present "either in person or through representatives"[19] For 
Hooker the power of making laws, the principal feature of "political power" - as 
Bodin had argued - "must belong to the whole and not to a part of the body 
politic", that is, to Parliament and not to the King or any of the Chambers 
individually[20]  
 
It is necessary to take into account that for Smith as well as for Hooker - and 
even earlier for Fortescue - the sovereignty of Parliament was inseparable from 
the doctrine of the "mixed State" that Plato and Aristotle had expounded in 
antiquity and that Thomas Aquinas had collected in "De Regimine 
Principum"[21] However, these authors identified the State or mixed 
government with the subordination of the King to Parliament as an entity and, 
accordingly, with a government limited by law, that is, with the rule of law[22] On 
the other hand, early during the 17th century - as we shall see later - the idea of 
the mixed State was identified above all with the joining of the Monarch, the 
House of Lords and the House of Commons, in which the three 'proper' forms of 
Government as described by Plato and Aristotle were joined: the monarchy, the 
aristocracy and democracy. A union comparable only to that which had 
characterised the Constitution of the Roman Republic, praised by Polibio in 
Volume VI of his "History of Rome" and by Cicero in the first two books of "De 
re publica".  
 
In any case, what we are interested in highlighting is that the defence of the 
sovereignty of Parliament clearly distinguished 16th century English doctrine 
from that of the continent, in which the public power was imputed exclusively to 
the Monarch, who started to be considered not so much an entity subject to law 
but as its creator. This absolutist thesis was greatly assisted by some of Roman 
Law precedents, such as princeps legibus solutus est; quod principi placuit. 
Legis habet vigorem; rex est animata lex; or Summa Sedes a nemine iudicatur 
from Cannon Law.  
 
It was on the basis of these principles that Jean Bodin, in his 1576 work Les Six 
Livres de la Republique, expressed the concept of sovereignty, the most 
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characteristic element of which was the supreme creation of law[23] Bodin, as it 
is well known, attributed sovereignty to the Monarch and criticised without any 
reservations, as Machiavello had done before him and Hobbes would do later, 
the theory of the 'mixed state', as the characteristic element of sovereign power 
was the unity and indivisibility of power[24] But in England, where the influence 
of Roman Law was weaker than in the Continent (unlike in Scotland)[25] the 
supreme power of the State continued being imputed to Parliament.  
 
It is not - and let us be clear about this - that the concept of sovereignty was 
negated, that would have been equivalent to negating the reality of the modern 
State itself, but that instead of imputing it on the Monarch - as in the continent - 
it was chosen to impute it to a complex entity: the King with his Parliament[26]  
 
2.3. Absolutism and Constitutionalism under the Stuarts  
 
Following the example of the Bourbons in France and the Spanish Hapsburgs, 
the Stuarts - even more than the Tudors - purported to end the institutional and 
regulatory limits of the Monarchy. To be more precise, if the Tudors purported to 
implement a de facto suppression of the old English Constitution, the Stuarts 
tried to do it de jure, impugning some of its basic principles. James I, the first 
king of this dynasty, defended the sovereignty of the Monarch and its divine 
origins in his essay The True Law of Free Monarchies, in which he held some 
premises completely foreign to English constitutional tradition. "The Monarchy - 
this intellectual king lectured Parliament on 21 March 1610 - is the most sublime 
thing on earth, for the kings are not only God's lieutenants on earth, sitting on 
God's throne, but even God calls the kings gods"[27]  
 
Supporting the pretensions of James I, Francis Bacon argued that the authority 
of the Monarch was superior to the other two parts that made up Parliament - 
the Lords and the Commons - and that, consequently, the Monarch could 
dispense with complying with the laws given by Parliament in agreement with 
the king and also suspend their execution and even dictate Ordinances over 
them. Bacon, confronting the other institutional antagonist of absolutist rule, 
added that it wasn't the role of judges to make law, as held by Judge Coke, but 
only to interpret it: ius dicere and not ius dare[28]  
 
Both the Commons and the Judges responded to this absolutist thesis. The first 
held that the supreme power of the State was not only in the hands of the King 
but in Parliament as a whole. In 1628, and later in 1641 and in 1642 - John A. 
Pollock wrote in this respect - the aim of the House of Commons was not to limit 
the powers of the sovereign, but to demand that the sovereign himself re-
established those powers in legal terms. The King was a true King - or so 
parliamentarians thought - when he worked in Parliament with total respect for 
the law"[29]  
 
For their part common law judges defended the supremacy of customary law, 
not only over the law of regal prerogative but even over the Statutes approved 
by Parliament, as stated by Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke in 1610 when he 
argued in Bontham that " it happens from our writings that in many cases the 
common law will control the laws of Parliament, and sometimes it will declare 
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them totally void, for when a Act of the Parliament is contrary to the law and 
reason, or incompatible, or impossible to execute, the common law will control it 
and proceed to declare its nullity"[30] In this way Coke declared himself in 
favour of judicial control of Parliamentary legislation, the need for which would 
be faced some years later in America with the aim of ensuring the supremacy of 
the laws approved by the British Parliament over the rules of colonial origin, 
which meant an undoubted precedent of the concept of judicial review that 
would be established in the United States from the Constitution of 1787[31]  
 
As GP Gooch recalls, for Coke - the main inspiration behind the 1628 Petition of 
Rights, which defended the old principle that only Parliament could approve 
taxes - Parliament had the duty of declaring and defending the law, but not that 
of creating it[32]  
 
To defend their arguments, common law judges - although not only them - 
called upon an idea of extraordinary importance: that of the Old Constitution. In 
this respect, Pocock, the most relevant student of this concept, highlighted that 
according to the doctrine of the 'Old Constitution' or of the 'Fundamental Laws', 
English law, far from being derived from the acts of any sovereign (or 
succession of sovereigns), originated from very ancient precedents. 
Sovereignty was nothing but the final authority that declares which was the pre-
existing law[33] Glen Burgess also insisted on the paramount role played by the 
concept of the "Old Constitution" in the English political debate of the 17th 
century, but emphasised the central thesis sustained by Pocock, insisting that 
this 'Old Constitution' was not defended appealing only to its 'antiquity' and to its 
primarily customary foundations, as Sir Edward Coke would, but also to its 
conformity with a "rational system"[34]  
 
In any case, it must be added that throughout the 17th century, common law 
judges were forced to accept - not without complaints - the supremacy of the 
Statutes approved by Parliament in exchange for Parliament's recognition of the 
importance of customary law within the system - only subject to the laws of 
Parliament - and the essential role of Judges in the Rule of Law. In reality the 
alliance between Parliament (particularly the Commons) and the common law 
judges was fundamental to the triumph of Constitutionalism over Absolutism. An 
alliance that facilitated the acknowledgement that additionally Parliament was 
the highest judicial authority in the kingdom.  
 
Shortly before the breakout of the civil war, on 27 May 1642 to be precise, the 
thesis of the sovereignty of Parliament as an essential element of English 
Constitutional law was defended again. That day the Lords and the Commons 
declared, in opposition to Charles I, that Parliament was the Constitutionally 
authorised Council to 'preserve public peace and the security of the 
Kingdom'[35]  
 
In June 1642 both chambers of Parliament resolved to forward a document to 
Charles I - known as the 'Nineteen Propositions' - in which they reminded him 
that Parliament was the King's 'Highest and Supreme Council' and the 
repository of the duty to resolve 'the great matters of the Kingdom and to name 
the high officers of the State[36]   
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In response to this document - that so strongly highlighted the sovereignty of 
Parliament - the closest advisors to the King approved another, again in 1642, 
which defended the old doctrine of the mixed State in a novel and 
transcendental manner for the future history of English constitutional theory. In 
this respect Pocock wrote that it had already being spoken in the past of a 
mixed monarchy, in the sense of a mixture of monarchy and law or of an 
equilibrium between the primacy of the monarch and the supremacy of the law. 
However, as Pocock added, what the advisors to Charles I proposed in their 
Answer to the Nineteen Proposition was something altogether different. It was a 
mixture of the monarchy and the other forms of government: monarchy in the 
person of the king, aristocracy in the Lords and democracy in the Commons. 
Each one of these parts should exercise a distinct kind of power: the king 
should decide; the Lords advice; and the Commons assent. For each one of 
these three powers had a specific 'virtue', destined without doubt to degenerate 
when the vigilance of the other two weakened. The equilibrium of the 
Constitution consisted in a distribution of powers with the aim of ensuring to 
each the possibility of preventing the corruption of the other two[37]  
 
In a much more philosophical manner and, accordingly, less tied up to the 
political and constitutional fights of the times, the absolutist pretensions of 
Charles I - as against the supporters of Parliament and the Judges of the 
common law - had in Sir Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes two unconditional 
supporters. In 'The Patriarch', a work probably written between 1631 and 1642 - 
although published for the first time in 1680 - Filmer defended the absolutist 
thesis under the undoubted influence of Bodin, whose own 'Six Books on the 
Republic' had being translated into English in 1606. Filmer, nevertheless, based 
himself in a clearly patriarchal conception, foreign to the French jurist, but 
reasonably widespread at the beginning of the 17th century. Patriarchalism had 
been adopted - for example - by Adrian Saravia - an author of Flemish origin 
that had extracted his thesis from the Holy Scriptures, particularly from Genesis 
- John Buckeridge, Lancelot Andrewes and Thomas Jackson. Filmer directed 
his patriarchalist doctrine, above all, against two catholic thinkers, Cardinal 
Belarmino and the Jesuit Suarez, both in favour of the popular origin of regal 
power, as well as the Scottish protestant George Buchanan[38] In 'The Anarchy 
of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy', published in 1648, Filmer rebated, as Bodin as 
done before him, the theory of the mixed State, so closely linked, as we have 
seen, to the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament[39]  
 
If from Filmer we go on to Hobbes, which means jumping from mediocrity to 
genius, it is necessary to remember that in 'Elements of Law' (the manuscript 
circulated in 16[40] a few months before the convocation of the 'Long 
Parliament') and in 'De Cive' (written in France and published in Latin in 1642), 
Hobbes had put forward a great part of his most relevant ideas. Nevertheless 
his most complete work was 'Leviatham', which saw the light of day in 1651, two 
years after the execution of Charles I. Here Hobbes defended regal sovereignty 
from a extraordinary and abstract contractualist doctrine, inspired in Grocius, 
and based on notions of the state of nature and the social pact which allowed 
him to take his doctrine to the ultimate consequences that Bodin had argued in 
a somewhat incoherent way. An author still attached to scholastic ideas of the 
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subjection pact and of the leges imperii, or fundamental laws of the kingdom, as 
well as the subordination of positive law to natural law and to divine law. These 
last theories were also argued by Smith and Hooker. With Hobbes, Aristotelian 
and Aquinas's political philosophy was demolished and the modern theory of 
the State was born in its place. A theory that allowed to completely purify the 
concept of sovereignty, liberating it from the ties to which the scholastic theories 
of power were leading. In effect, for the great English philosopher, the sovereign 
was not subject to the fundamental laws since its sovereignty was born, not 
from a social pact or bilateral contract entered between the King and his people, 
but from a social pact developed by individuals in the state of nature, that is, in 
a pre-judicial period. Accordingly positive law did not precede the State (as it 
had been argued in Medieval thought and even by Bodin himself by recognising 
the subjection of the sovereign to the fundamental laws), but by creation of the 
State. It is true that Hobbes continued recognising the supremacy of Natural 
Law over Positive Law, but he broke the nexus between Natural Law and Divine 
Law by sustaining a concept - taken from Grocius - purely inherent, not 
consequent, from Natural Law. A concept of law that could be thought - as this 
last writer said - even if God did not exist. In reality Hobbes reduced Natural 
Law to simple dictates of reason, convenient to follow, but to which he denied 
their judicial nature given that they lacked legitimate human legal power to 
impose their compliance, as argued in Leviathan40. In this way, Natural Law 
could be reduced to a single maxim: it is a requirement of Natural Law to accept 
to submit to Positive Law[41]  
 
Hobbes transcends jus-naturalism and settles the basis of judicial positivism, 
later to be developed by Hume[42]  
 
But Hobbes's theories upset the followers of the Monarch as much as those of 
Parliament: to the former, because of individualist and proto-democratic 
rationalism ; to the latter because its natural outcome was the defence of 
monarchical absolutism, although in reality this last conclusion was purely 
circumstantial and did not affect the nucleus of his reasoning: the articulation of 
a sovereign public power that represented the whole of society, as Aquinas had 
conceived. Of course Hobbes did not stop criticising the doctrine of the mixed 
state, understanding, as Bodin and Filmer had done before him, that it 
destroyed the concept of sovereignty itself[43]  
 
Following the restoration of the Monarchy in 1660, putting to an end the 
republican regime installed by Cromwell, the conservatives and even the 
'reactionaries' defenders of the old English Constitution again defended the 
supremacy of the laws over the regal 'Proclamations' in the same way as the 
privileges of the two Chambers of Parliament as against the pretensions of the 
Crown - now incarnated - first in the person of Charles II, and then in that of 
James II. These theories - of which Algernon Sidney was prominent in their 
defence, and for that very reason executed in the Tower of London[44] were 
expressed in a very important document: the Bill of Rights of 13 February 1689, 
where the political-juridical foundation of the 'glorious' revolution of 1688 can be 
found[45]  
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2.4. The Rule of Law and Parliamentary Sovereignty Parliament  
 
This Bill of Rights - stated in this traditional manner to overcome the distrust of 
the Tories towards any idea of a social contract - encapsulated the aspirations 
that the Commons and, to an extent, what the Judges of the common law had 
sustained for the whole of the century in the fight to limit the powers of the 
Monarch. Aspirations that Locke would systematised in his "Second Treatise on 
Civil Government", as we shall see later on. Very particularly this Bill 
consecrated the two most relevant principles of English public law: the Rule of 
Law and the Sovereignty of Parliament. Two principles that, in the judgement of 
the revolutionaries of 1688, had been hollowed by James II, 'with the assistance 
of bad advisors, judges and ministers' which had forced the two Chambers of 
Parliament to make him abdicate[46]  
 
By virtue of both principles, 'the spiritual and temporal Lords and the Commons, 
constituting the full and free representation of the nation', and with the aim of 
'defending and ensuring the ancient rights and freedoms f the English', 
submitted William and Mary - as well as the future kings of England - to a body 
of restrictions. The first and most important of these was to submit to the laws 
approved by Parliament, expressly prohibiting their suspension or dispensing 
with their application - as James II had tried to do in 1687 and 1688 with the 
Declarations of Indulgence, as well as approving taxes without the consent of 
Parliament, as both James I and Charles I had respectively attempted, with the 
acknowledgement of the Court of Exchequer, in Bate's Case (1606) and the 
Ship-Money Case (1637).  
 
The consent of Parliament was also considered necessary to recruit and 
maintain an Army within the boundaries of the Kingdom in times of peace. This 
important declaration recognised, at the same time, the right of subjects to 
petition the King as well as to carry weapons for their own defence. Lastly this 
document disposed that Parliamentary elections must be free, that freedom of 
expression within Parliament could not be controlled by any tribunal except 
Parliament itself, that unreasonable bails should not be demanded, that 
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishments should not be imposed, that 
Juries should be conveniently chosen and that fines and confiscation of 
property - to be lawful - had to be ordained by means of a judicial sentence.  
 
Two subsequent laws, approved during the reign of William III, completed and 
to a point ratified what was disposed in the 1689 Bill of Rights. It was the 
Triennial Act of 1694 by virtue of which the King was compelled to call 
Parliament at least once every three years[47] and the Act of Establishment, 
approved on 12 June 1701 with the fundamental aim of 'ensuring the 
succession of the Crown within the protestant line 1/4. and eliminate all the 
doubts and disputes that for this reason could arise 1/4'[48]  
 
This Act, in addition to demanding that in future the heir to the Crown had to be 
in communion with the Church of England, prohibited 'to solicit the forgiveness 
of the Great Seal of England in the impeachment laid out by the Commons'. 
Lastly, but by no means least important, the Act of Establishment ratified the 
Rule of Law with these words: " the laws of England are laws acquired by its 
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people by virtue of birth and all the kings and queens that occupy their throne 
must conduct their government in accordance as it is disposed in those laws 
and its Ministers and officials must conduct themselves in the same manner".  
 
 
III. SOVEREIGNTY IN JOHN LOCKE'S "SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL 
GOVERNMENT"  
 
3.1. Government by the consent of the governed  
 
As it is well known the principal theoretician of the 1688 revolution was John 
Locke, author of a key book in the development of English constitutional 
thinking and, in reality, of western constitutional thinking as well: An essay 
concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government, first 
published in 1690, although Locke, as demonstrated by Peter Laslett, had 
written it some years before the 1688 revolution[49]  
 
In this work Locke made his some theories that Hobbes had previously argued, 
particularly in Leviatham, such as the state of nature and the social pact. 
Hobbes had called upon both notions without contradicting their jus-rationalist 
suppositions. Hobbes did not care for the historical existence of the state of 
nature and the social pact, only for their instrumental value: they were 
hypotheses necessary to think rationally of the State as an artificial entity and, 
accordingly, expendable, lacking in history and substantially distinct from the 
animal kingdom[50] In his opinion the celebration of the social pact leads 
inexorably to individuals - until then in a State of Nature - ceding their rights to 
the sovereign, that is, the State, with the aim of guaranteeing external peace 
and internal security and accordingly, the existence of a society composed 
exclusively of equal and selfish individuals. A State conceived as persona ficta, 
in which the Monarch had to exercise all powers, without the people being able 
to depose him.  
 
On the other hand, Locke's jus-naturalist suppositions, and particularly the 
notions of the state of nature and the social pact, indebted to the rationalist 
philosophy of its century (Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibnitz) clearly 
contradicted their gnoseological presumptions, specially its critique of innate 
ideas. A critique that had been expanded in An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding. Locke published this work in 1690, although written earlier, 
where he makes his the empirical philosophy that Francis Bacon had developed 
in Novum Organum and that Newton would develop in the field of physics[51]  
 
But what really was important to Locke in his Essay on Civil Government was to 
justify a new Monarchy, constitutional or, as he calls it, 'moderate'[52] using an 
expression with a clear Aquinas's flavour, based on the consent of the 
people[53] A type of monarchy that would shape the 1688 revolution and in 
which it could be seen - although, as it will be said, this was not the most widely 
accepted interpretation - if not the end of a non-historical state of nature, at 
least a renovation of a no less supposed English social pact, following the 
dissolution of the State as a result of the absolutist policies of James II.  
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On the other hand, the consequences extracted by Locke from the theories of 
the state of nature and the social pact were truly very different from those 
extracted by Hobbes. For Hobbes, the celebration of the social pact by 
individuals living in the state of nature necessarily implied ceding all their rights 
to the sovereign, that is, according to Hobbes, the Monarch. On the other hand, 
Locke, in a less consistent form, understands that after the social pact, 
individuals continued maintaining their "natural rights", since sovereignty 
resided with the whole of them, with the community or people. The State 
resulting from the social pact, the supreme organ of which was the legislative 
power, had precisely the basic aim of maintaining these "natural rights" to life, 
property and personal security, the protection of which was, in his judgement, 
the basic aim of the social pact and, consequently of abandoning the state of 
nature[54] In this way, Locke sustained a theory of the State as utilitarian as 
that of Hobbes, but in which the public power as a whole was based in the 
consent of the governed, and as theirs also revocable[55]  
 
But what is now appropriate to underline is that Locke argued as much for the 
sovereignty of the legislative power as for the sovereignty of the people. A dual 
affirmation that according to Pollock is the weakest and most unsatisfactory 
aspect of his political theory[56] But before examining this matter, key to this 
work, it is necessary to briefly expound his doctrine of the separation of powers.  
 
3.2. The separation of powers  
 
In his penetrating study Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, MJC 
Vile highlighted that the English Civil War constituted an important milestone in 
the doctrine of the separation of powers. Until then it was common to simply 
distinguish the legislative power from the executive, as - for example - Masilio 
de Pauda had done. During the Civil War it became common to add a third 
power, judicial power, to which both Buchanan and Hooker had made reference 
some years before and to which people such as George Lawson and Philip 
Hunton[57] had referred to during the mid-17th century.  
 
When explaining the origin of powers in the state of nature, Locke appears to 
admit, in principle only two, the legislative and the executive. While the 
antecedent of the former was found in the faculty that all men had, in 
accordance with the Natural Law, to do what was considered convenient for 
their own security and for that of others, that of the latter was found in the 
faculty of punishing the abuses committed against the Natural Law[58]  
 
However, when he defends the need to escape the State of Nature to effectively 
protect natural rights, Locke adds to these two powers a third one: judicial 
power. Locke, in effect, recalls that the protection of natural rights demands 
firstly; a law which is established, accepted, known and firm that serves by 
common consensus as the norm for what is just and unjust and as common 
measure so that with it all disputes that arise between men can be resolved; 
secondly; a judge recognised and impartial, with authority to resolve all 
differences, in accordance with the established law; and thirdly a sufficient 
power that backs and sustains the sentence when this is just and executes it 
accordingly[59]  
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Nevertheless, Locke - who used the word 'power' equally to refer to an organ 
and to a function, for which at times it is difficult to interpret his exposition - later 
on definitely abandons this tripartite classification of the organs or functions of 
the State, substituting it for a new one, according to which he distinguishes the 
legislative, executive and federalist functions, without mentioning the judicial 
function at all. Such an omission did not mean that he undervalued the 
importance of the judiciary at the heart the Constitutional State. On the contrary, 
as underlined by Vile, for Locke the main function of the State is essentially 
juridical. Consequently the State is the judge lacking in the State of Nature[60]  
 
What was the reason why the English thinker does not mention the judiciary as 
an autonomous function or the Judicature as an organ or power distinct from 
the executive and the legislature? To answer that question it is required to take 
into account that in England there was no neat organic distinction between the 
judicial power and the legislative and no clear distinction between the legislative 
and judicial functions. If the House of Lards was - and still remains - the 
supreme Tribunal of the Kingdom, the Judges created law at the same time that 
they applied it, given that their judgements became precedents that linked them 
to the future when it came about to resolve similar cases[61]  
 
In any case, the fundamental aim of Locke consisted in attributing to two 
distinctive organs the legislative power and the executive power, without 
prejudice to the relationship mechanisms that he established between both 
organs, to which we will refer to later. . Locke, in effect, holds that 'moderate 
monarchies' as much as from the other 'well constituted governments', the 
legislative and executive powers "are found in different hands"[62]  
 
Previously he had made it clear that well ordered political communities and in 
which the well being of the people that make them up is taken into account, the 
legislative power usually is placed in the hands of several people properly 
convened, that is, in an Assembly[63] contrary to what happens with the 
executive power, that, being a 'permanent' power, exercised without interruption, 
tends to be attributed to a single person[64]  
 
This attribute of the basic powers of the State to two distinct organs 
distinguished the "moderate monarchies" and the other "well constituted 
governments" from the "absolute monarchies", where "the prince holds in 
himself" both powers, for which "there is no judge or manner in which to appeal 
to someone capable of deciding with justice and impartiality as well as with 
authority to sentence, and who can not remedy or compensate any wrong or 
damage that the prince might have caused by himself or by his order"[65]  
 
However, by pronouncing himself in favour of attributing the legislative and 
executive powers to different bodies, Locke did not only purported, although he 
did primarily, to denounce the absolute monarchy in which the King exercised 
both powers, but also in the assembly-type government based in the monopoly 
of those two powers by an Assembly. In this respect Locke no doubt had in 
mind the historical experience of the "Long Parliament (1640-1649) "true 
turnaround point in the political history of the English speaking races"[66]   
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No doubt that was the experience that Locke thought about when he pointed 
out that it was not "convenient, since it would be too strong a temptation for 
human weaknesses, that has the tendency to hang on to power, to trust the 
task of executing the laws to the same persons that have the duty to make 
them". The English philosopher added that, if the legislature and the executive 
were in the same hands, it run the grave risk that the laws would not be obeyed 
and that they would be drafted and applied in accordance with 'particular 
interests" and not with the interest of the whole community, which would be 
contrary "to the finality of society and of government"[67]  
 
If the legislative power consisted in the faculty of approving laws, the executive, 
in Locke's judgement, included two functions: that properly called executive and 
the federative, the distinction of which constitutes Locke's most important 
contribution to the doctrine of the functions of the State[68] Both spheres tended 
to and should be attributed to the same entity, which is England was none other 
than the Monarch. "These two powers - he wrote - the executive and the 
federative, are in reality distinct in themselves; however, despite one 
encompassing the execution of the laws of society within it and to all those who 
are part of it, and the other is in charge of the security and the exterior interests 
of the population, with respect to whom it could be useful and prejudicial, it 
happens that almost always they are found together"[69]  
 
But in addition to exercising the executive and federative powers, the Monarch 
could participate in the elaboration of the laws. In this respect Locke wrote, no 
doubt thinking in the Royal Assent, that in some political communities "the 
executive is delegated in one single person that also participates in the 
legislative power"[70] Likewise Locke considers that it was inherent upon the 
Monarch the faculty of calling and dissolving the Assembly[71] given that - 
again considering the Long Parliament - he estimates that "the constant or 
frequent meeting of the legislators and the long duration of their useless 
Assemblies, result by force heavy on the people, encouraging in the long term 
more dangerous inconveniences that those that were being attempted to 
avoid"[72]  
 
This relevant constitutional position, through which he participated in the 
approval of the laws that he ordered and whose execution he directed, allowed 
even to affirm that the "supreme power" of the State rested upon the Monarch. 
"Not because he holds all the supreme power, which is the one that makes the 
laws, but because in him resides the supreme power of their execution, from 
whom all inferior magistrates derive their powers, 1/4 not being also a legislative 
organ superior to him, given that no law can be made without his consent"[73]  
 
However, if it was not convenient for the Monarch to limit himself to executing 
the law, it was not convenient for the Parliament to limit itself to approved them 
either, instead it also had to control their execution, as it happened in the 
England of his day through the process of impeachment. A process established 
to demand the penal responsibility of the members of the executive - except 
that of the Monarch, without political or juridical responsibility - before the two 
Houses of Parliament. "[even when] the legislative power has entrusted the 
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powers to implement the laws made by Parliament, Parliament always retains 
the right to withdraw those powers if it finds cause for that purpose and likewise 
to punish any infraction"[74]  
 
Without question Locke was as much in favour of attributing to two different 
organs the exercise of legislative and executive powers as to distribute between 
them the exercise of these powers. In other words: the English philosopher 
showed himself in favour not only of the separation of powers, but also of the 
doctrine of constitutional balance of power.  
 
Although these two doctrines were usually accompanied by the old doctrine of 
the mixed state - as it will continue to occur after Locke, as we shall see later on 
- it can not, on the other hand, be considered that the English thinker was in 
support of the latter. Passerin D'Entreves observes in this respect that Locke 
did not pretend to divide sovereignty, but only its exercise under the supremacy 
of the legislative power, although the distinction between title to and exercise of 
sovereignty, forewarned by Bodin, was not formulated until the French 
Revolution[75] M.J.C. Vile, for his part, points out that Locke did not make too 
much emphasis in the theory of the mixed state , preferring instead to focus his 
analysis in the relationship between the Legislature and the Executive, with 
almost no reference to the House of Lords[76]  
 
In reality, Locke only mentions the mixed forms of Government in passing in 
chapter X of the book currently under examination, dedicated to the different 
forms of the Commonwealth[77] while he only alludes to the House of Lords in 
the last chapter, and even then, indirectly: "let us assume - he wrote - that the 
legislative power has been granted simultaneously to three different persons: 
first, one only hereditary person that holds the supreme executive power in a 
permanent manner and, with this power, that of calling the other two within fixed 
periods; second, an Assembly constituted by a hereditary nobility; thirdly, an 
Assembly of representatives chosen, pro tempore, by the people"[78]  
 
At the end of it all it is appropriate not to lose sight that in this book Locke does 
not try to specifically analyse the English Constitution, but that of the Free-State 
in general, although it becomes evident that he can not forget his native country, 
to which he refers constantly, although almost never naming it.  
 
3.3. The supremacy and limits of the legislature  
 
Now, if in order to retain liberty it was necessary that the executive and 
legislative powers be in different hands, the later should be, according to Locke, 
the supreme power of the State given that " he who can impose laws on another, 
by nature, must be superior to him"[79] The supremacy of the legislature made 
the State, even when it was headed by a hereditary king, in a government with 
the consent of the governed, essential requirement to affirm its own 
legitimacy[80]  
 
Attributing to the legislature - of which the King could be part of under the terms 
outlined - the supremacy in the heart of the State, the English philosopher was 
doing nothing more than to take refuge under some new contractual and 
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utilitarian suppositions, to the already old English doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty, formulated by Fortescue, Thomas Smith and Richard Hooker, the 
last being cited repeatedly quoted by Locke[81] And as the supremacy of the 
legislative power carries with it the supremacy of the law - we will see now what 
type of law - Locke also subscribed to the other great constitutional doctrine 
held in England from the days of Bracton: the rule of law.  
 
Nevertheless, to Locke, the supremacy of the legislature did not imply that the 
Assembly had to absorb the executive power, not even to doubt its organic and 
functional autonomy, as the Long Parliament had attempted during the reign of 
Charles I.  
 
Locke - Vile writes - clarifies time and again that no State organ is omnipotent, 
that the legislature and the executive have an autonomous status. By 
supremacy of the legislature Locke does not mean that the executive becomes 
a messenger, totally subordinate to the legislature in the exercise of its own 
functions. On the contrary, the power of the Legislature is circumscribed to the 
exercise of its own functions[82]  
 
On the other hand, that the legislature was the supreme organ of the State does 
not mean that it was an unlimited or arbitrary entity. Its function, as that of the 
State as a whole, had to be limited to the assurance of "Natural Rights", that 
was the main aim of the social pact that had created it. From this point of view it 
could be affirmed that, at least implicitly, Locke came to recognise that the 
social pact or contract became an initial limit of the legislative power. That is 
how Nicola Matteucci understood it when he remembered that to Locke the 
legislative power was limited by the first and fundamental positive law that 
institutes it, that is, by the social contract, which is presented as a true 
constituent power, superior to the legislature; the theoretical base for a 
hierarchical distinction between constitutional and legislative rules[83]  
 
But additionally, in the all-important chapter XI of his Essay of Civil Government, 
Locke expressly acknowledges other limits to the power of the legislature, 
imposed in this instance by "society", by "divine law" and by "natural law". That 
way, in effect, such power could not be attributed , as the Long Parliament had 
done during the Civil War, the faculty of governing by improvised and arbitrary 
decree, but that it was compelled to dispense justice and to point out the rights 
of the subjects by means of permanent and proclaimed laws, applied by known 
and appointed judges. The laws approved by the legislature had to be, 
additionally, general and identical for rich and poor, for the Court's Mandarin 
and for the farmer behind the plow, without any other finality except the good of 
the people. Nor was the Legislature allowed to impose taxes without the 
consent of the people, expressed directly or by means of its representative. 
Lastly, the legislature was forbidden to transfer the faculty of making laws to any 
other person, for it was only to the legislature that the people had delegated the 
power[84]  
 
Pollock holds that by recognising such limits Locke joined a conception of 
sovereignty deeply ingrained within the students of the Common law from the 
beginnings of 17th century, through which it was accepted that natural justice or 
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the common right imposed certain limits that even the King in Parliament could 
not trespass; which meant that Judges had to ignore a law of the Parliament 
that was manifestly contrary to natural justice and which perhaps attempted to 
subvert the fundamentals of the Constitution, for example, if it purported to 
abolish the Monarchy or the House of Commons[85]  
 
What is beyond doubt, as JW Gough recalls, is that although Locke recognised 
the "supremacy of parliament", he was not referring to its sovereignty in the 
Hobbessian sense of the term[86]  
 
3.4. The sovereignty of the people  
 
In addition to the limits to which the legislature was subject, it is important not to 
lose sight that for Locke, above this power, there was the sovereign power of 
the people[87] Consistently with that thesis Locke held that the violation of the 
limits to which the legislature was subject justified the people's right of 
resistance. A right that Hobbes had previously expressly rejected and over 
which Locke expands in the last two chapters of his Essay on Civil Government 
titled "On tyranny " and " Of the dissolution of the Government". In Locke's 
judgement, the people, acting for just cause, had the right not only to replace its 
rulers, but also to change the form of the State itself, understanding for the 
people not the Parliament or even the House of Commons, but the political 
community as a distinct and separate entity[88]  
 
Although Marsilio de Padua and the Monarchists and [MC1]had previously 
already defended the sovereignty of the people, Mcclean[89] - and above all 
Franklin[90] - have shown that from this perspective the most relevant influence 
on Locke was the doctrine that George Lawson had exposed in Politica Sacra 
et Civiles. In this work - written in 1657, although unpublished until 1660, prior to 
the return of Charles II, republished in 1689 - Lawson had managed to reconcile 
the doctrine of the mixed state with that of popular sovereignty, until then 
considered incompatible[91]  
 
For Lawson, the conflict between the King and Parliament after the 1642 Civil 
War had provoked a complete dissolution of the State and the reversion of 
power to the people, the sole legitimate subject to constitute a new authority. 
Sovereignty then did not reside in the two Chambers of Parliament but in the 
people[92]  
 
Although this conception was not considered during the time of James II, 
appearing too radical, Locke assumed it when writing his "Second Treatise on 
Civil Government", being the only political writer of relevance to do so. Locke 
read Lawson's work around 1679, just as he was preparing his response to 
Filmer. As Franklin wrote, not only the theory of the right to resist, but also the 
basic structure of the Second Treatise corresponds with Lawson's doctrine of on 
sovereignty'[93]  
 
For Locke, Lawson's thesis on the dissolution of the State and the recovery of 
sovereignty by the people was the only validation to resolve the problem of the 
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right to resist within the framework - not only of the mixed Constitution - but also 
of any type of Constitution[94]  
 
On the other hand the majority of his fellow Whigs did not accept Locke's thesis 
in this respect. Effectively faithful to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
they wanted to reconcile the right of resistance against the tyrant (James II) with 
the respect of the independence of the King before parliament and even with 
the supremacy of the Monarch within the Constitution. That is what for example 
Whig publicist Gilbert Burnest maintained in An Enquiry into Measures of 
Submission, a pamphlet published in Holland in 1687, with the approval of 
William of Orange[95] The main objective of the Whigs was to enthrone this 
Monarch as King of England, not in the name of the people, but under his own 
right, preserving dynastic continuity. After all William's wife, Maria, was the 
daughter of Jmes II, and she would have inherited the title of Queen following 
her husband's death[96]  
 
Definitely then, in accepting the sovereignty of the people, Locke not only broke 
away from the otherwise so different absolutist theses of Filmer and Hobbes, 
but also from the classic English formulation of Parliamentary Sovereignty (of 
the King and the two legislative Chambers), held by Smith and before him by 
Hooker and afterwards by Hume and Blackstone, as we'll see now.  
 
 
IV. FROM HUME TO PALEY  
 
4.1. David Hume, Locke's critic: Parliament is sovereign, not the people  
 
Following the publication of Locke's "Second Treatise on Civil Government", 
and until Hume's "Treatise on Human Nature", that is, between 1690 to 1739, 
political and constitutional debate in Great Britain was not particularly brilliant. 
Its most relevant protagonists were Robert Walpole, the all-powerful Whig 
Prime Minister to George I and George II, in power from 1721 to 1742, and Lord 
Bollinbroke, the most acute Tory publicist of the first half of the 18th century[97] 
However this debate was not centred on sovereignty nor, more particularly, 
whether it resided in the people or in parliament - a question resolved by the 
Septennial Act of 1716 clearly on the side of positive right[98] - but in the 
relationship between the King and his Ministers with the two Chambers of 
Parliament.  
 
In this respect both writers remained faithful to Locke's doctrine of the 
separation of powers and of the "constitutional balance", although Bollinbroke 
also insisted in the 'mixed' character of the British Monarchy, something that 
Locke had not done. The question that radically separated Walpole from 
Bollinbroke resided in the reach of the 'influence' of the executive - the King and 
his Ministers - over the two Chambers of Parliament. An 'influence' that often 
was no more than pure corruption. While Walpole, interested defender of the 
incipient system of parliamentary government, considered this influence 
necessary and which required that the Ministers be members of one of the two 
Chambers of Parliament, Bollinbroke understood that such 'influence' 
questioned the separation of powers and destroyed the basis of the British 
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Constitution and the constitutional monarchy system of government that the 
1688 revolution had created[99]  
  
Contrary to Walpole and Bollinbroke, David Hume, who was not a politician but 
a great philosopher, confronted the always difficult problem of sovereignty, 
deconstructing with extraordinary lucidity and coherence the jus-naturalist 
doctrine and revitalising the old concept of parliamentary sovereignty[100]  
  
Hume's theses on sovereignty were very original. They diverged from those 
held by the two great English parties, Whigs and Tories, or as he sometimes 
liked to describe them, following Bollinbroke, as 'the party of the country' and 
'the party of the Court'[101] Effectively Hume radically differed from the Tory 
thesis of the divine right of kings and of passive obedience, but at the same 
time rejected the contractual foundation of the State, that in its version of Locke, 
although somewhat softened, was essential to Whig political ideology. In 
Hume's judgement it was a question of refuting "the speculative political 
systems proposed in this country, the religious of one party as much as the 
philosophical of the other"[102] Despite this equidistant perspective, Hume 
dedicated much more attention to the Whig thesis than he did to the Tory, the 
latter being, contrary to the former, as Hume himself recognised[103] clearly 
discredited.  
  
Hume's enormous contribution consisted in criticising the metaphysics of the 
state of nature, of the social contract and of natural rights, sustained by the 
rationalist jus-naturalism- so fashionable in his century - without for that reason 
failing to construct an authentic utilitarians and individualistic theory of the State, 
the articulation of which was impossible from the conceptual schemes, 
organisational and moralising, of the traditional political philosophy that derived 
from Aristotle and Aquinas. Hume's theory of the State was, in reality, as 
individualist and utilitarian as that of Hobbes, the other great British philosopher. 
Nevertheless, unlike Hobbes, he did not sunk his roots in an inductive and 
rationalist method and, accordingly, prioritary, but in another one, deductive and 
empirical, based in observation and experience, in which the lessons provided 
by history played great relevance. Hume's method being highly precise, 
suggestive and influential[104]  
  
By elaborating his philosophy in accordance with experience and observation, 
Hume openly criticises self-evident truths and, generally, every axiom not 
demonstrable empirically, starting with the very idea of Natural Law, that is, of 
some laws valid throughout time and place, established from an eternal and 
immutable morality, whether conceived as emanating divinely or, as Grotius had 
affirmed, etiamsi daremus Deum non esse.  
  
For that reason, if Hobbes had destroyed the old transcendental Natural Law, 
based above all in the juridical-political philosophy elaborated by Aristotle and 
christianised and de-paganised by Aquinas, the most brilliant update of which 
was in the work of Francisco Suárez, Hume undressed the new rationalist 
Natural Law, essentially inherent, of its Protestant origins[105] at the same time 
that he administered a massive blow to natural and rational ethics and religion 
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in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religions and in The Natural History of 
Religion[106]  
  
In this way Hume decisively contributed to the reconstruction of political thought 
and the Theory of the State[107] although his contribution to constitutional 
theory in the strict sense deserves less interest and is indebted in great 
measure to Locke and Bollinbroke. In Hume's opinion, sociability was indivisible 
from human nature, as manifested by observation and experience[108]  
  
But to state that society was of natural origin did not mean to negate that artifice 
or convention played a fundamental role in the creation of the most relevant 
social institutions, such as property. Quite on the contrary, Hume sustains that 
these institutions did not have a natural origin but that they were the result of 
'conventions'[109] that is, of agreements that individuals tacitly accepted, 
conscientious that they were in their mutual interest. With the passage of time, 
these conventions became true regulatory rules of human conduct. Within them 
Hume highlights the 'rules of justice', destined to protect property and, currently, 
the basic mechanisms of what we now call market economy. In The Treatise on 
Human Nature - his first and most relevant book - the Scottish philosopher 
recalled that the three principal rules of justice were the 'stability of possession', 
the 'transfer by consent' and the 'compliance of promises'[110]  
  
But the conventions had not only created the most relevant social and 
economical institutions, such as property and the market, but also political 
institutions, such as the State itself. In effect the State had an artificial or 
conventional origin. Its creation - along with the positive rights with which it was 
born - was made necessary as society had become more complex. As Hume 
wrote, the human animal - as he progresses, sees himself compelled to 
establish a political society with the aim of administering justice, without which 
there can be nom peace, nor security nor mutual relations[111]  
  
In that manner Hume reconciled the artificial character of the State, 
energetically affirmed by Hobbes and by the whole of the rationalist jus-
naturalism after him, and the natural sociability of mankind, that Aristotle and 
Aquinas thinking had defended in order to sustain the natural essence of public 
power. But that the State - against what traditional jus-naturalism sustained - 
had a conventional origin, did not mean that it was the fruit of an expressed 
consent, reproduced in a pact or social contract - as rationalist jus-naturalism 
defended - and particularly Locke, the writer with whom Hume argues in this 
respect, nor that any such consent was the foundation of the State[112] In 
reality, the existence of a social pact was proven neither by history nor by 
experience in any place or time. On the contrary 'almost all governments in 
existence today or those which history remembers, were originally founded on 
usurpation or conquest, if not both, without any pretensions of free consent or 
subjection on the part of the people'[113]  
  
Hume does not deny that the express and active consent of the people, 
reflected in a pact or social contract, could be considered a just reason for the 
State, Furthermore, he doesn't hesitate to point out that where it happens is 
without doubt the best and most sacred. He added that what he affirmed is that 
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rarely - if ever - happens; and consequently we also have to admit other 
foundations for the State since reason, history and experience show us that 
political societies have had a less precise and regular origin[114]  
  
But Hume not only rejects the social contract for historical reasons (at the end 
of the day the less relevant in terms of contractualist arguments, specially for 
Hobbes and even for Locke), but above all for philosophical reasons. If such a 
pact or contract could not be considered as the creative or founding cause of 
the State - as it could easily be shown contrasting such theory with an 
observation of the historical reality - Hume points out that even where there 
such a pact or contract had existed at some stage, the criteria to legitimise the 
State was not to be found in this pact or contract (or in the expressed consent of 
the people that such a pact or contract implied), but in the utility of the State 
itself to satisfy the interests of its subjects. In his judgement, in effect, the pacts 
celebrated by the parents could not bind their descendants unless they implicitly 
accepted to continue by considering them useful. For that reason the duty of 
obedience to the State was not to be looked for in the expressed consent of 
each individual, reflected in a supposed contract or social pact, solemn and 
written, but in the conviction, born of simple common sense, that without the 
State 'society could not subsist'[115]  
  
In reality the consent of the people - rather than active and reflected in a solemn 
form in the 'loyalty' and 'fidelity' of the subjects of the State - most often was 
tacit and passive, reflected in the loyalty and fidelity of the subjects to the State, 
not necessarily embodied in a Monarch for the mere fact of having been born 
under its dominion or to have passed to depend from it through the vicissitudes 
of history. 'Obedience and subjection end up being so familiar that the majority 
of men do not dig for their origin or cause[116]  
  
The legitimacy of the State, then, was strengthened with the passage of time, 
which allowed for the accommodation of the political institutions to the public 
opinion of each period[117] Time even legitimised what in its beginnings had 
been considered as illegitimate. In The Treatise on Human Nature he had 
already established that it was time and custom that conferred authority to all 
forms of government and to all princely successions, making power - originally 
founded only on injustice and violence - could, in the fullness of time become 
legal and compelling[118] Whelan recalls in this respect that for Hume 'long 
possession' or, what was virtually the same 'prescription' aside from being an 
important principle for the establishment of property, as juridical doctrine had 
been asserting for a considerable period of time, was in practise the most 
important criteria to legitimise the State, irrespective of its origins. A thesis that 
no one had asserted with such clarity until then - although Grocius and Vattel 
had opened the way for him - and that Burke would pick up later to formulate his 
doctrine of prescriptive government or prescriptive constitution[119]  
  
From these premises Hume examines the old question of the right of resistance, 
essential element of the political-juridical debate regarding sovereignty . For 
Hume it was not a question of justifying this right when the juridical limits 
solemnly established by the community in the political contract were exceeded, 
as it was argued from traditional jus-naturalism, or when natural rights were 
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breached, as Locke had argued, but pure and simply when the State - a specific 
form of it - ceased to be useful for the individuals. A thesis that he had already 
advanced in The Treatise on Human Nature where he held that the State, being 
a simple human invention for the benefit of society, the compulsion to obey its 
orders ceased as benefits came to an end, as happens when it exercises an 
'enormous tyranny and oppression'. An assumption under which it was 
legitimate to even raise up in arms against the supreme power[120] In his essay 
Of Passive Obedience he will again formulate this thesis. Here, after praising 
the irresponsibility of the King in Great Britain (summarised in the expressive 
principles The King can do no wrong & the King can not act alone ) he affirmed 
that such irresponsibility should not be identified with the Monarch's absolute 
immunity. On the contrary, when he protects his minister, perseveres in injustice 
and usurps all the powers of the community, it is totally justified to recourse to 
the right of resistance in order to defend the Constitution, although the laws may 
not make express reference to this [recourse] because the remedy is not 
available in the normal course of events, nor can they appoint a magistrate with 
sufficient authority to punish the excesses of the prince. But as a right without a 
sanction would be an absurdity - Hume adds - the remedy in this instance is the 
extraordinary one of resistance, when matters reach such an extreme that it is 
the only way in which the constitution can be defended. A method this that had 
been used to depose Charles I and James II, although - in his judgement - it 
should never be accompanied, as it had happened in the case of Charles I, of 
tyranny, 'justly suppressed today by the right of the people and universally 
condemned as an infamous and ruinous method[121]  
  
Having discarded the jus-naturalist argument of popular sovereignty, Hume 
prefers to tackle the problem of the titularity of sovereignty within the framework 
of the British juridical order, not abstractly, adhering himself to the classical 
thesis of Parliamentary Sovereignty. However Hume did not limit himself to 
repeating the classical thesis of Thomas Smith or that of Richard Hooker, 
liberating them from Locke's add-on of popular sovereignty, but he introduced 
an important hue by underlining the primacy of the Commons over the Lords 
and of course over the Monarch. A primacy that he justified by considering that 
it was through the Lower House that public opinion was regularly expressed, as 
he pointed out in his essay On the Independence of Parliament[122] published 
in 1741, during the reign of George II and towards the end of Robert Walpole's 
long mandate as Prime Minister.  
  
Hume - who in what concerned the relationship between the Crown and the two 
Houses of Parliament accepted the schemes of the mixed and balanced 
monarchy - in his judgement the best possible form of government, although he 
was closer to the thesis of Walpole than that of Bollinbroke[123] - held that the 
influence of the Crown resided in the executive power but recognised that such 
power was then completely subordinate to the legislature given that its exercise 
required large expenditure and the Commons had made their own the exclusive 
right to grant supply. The Scottish thinker added that the part of power that the 
Constitution granted to the House of Commons is so large that it allowed it to 
impose itself upon the other branches of government. In this respect he 
considers that the king's legislative power was an insufficient counterweight . 
That way in effect - no doubt taking into account that since the rejection by 
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Queen Anne I of the Scottish Militia Act of 1707, royal assent had not been 
denied to a law approved by the two Houses of Parliament - points out that 
although the Monarch had the right of veto in the elaboration of the laws, in 
practice he is given so little importance that when both Houses approve them it 
is certain that the laws will be proclaimed since royal assent is but a formality. 
On the other hand although it was true that the House of Lords constituted a 
powerful support for the Monarchy, given that its members were, at the same 
time, sustained by the Monarchy, experience as much as reason showed that 
the Lords had neither sufficient force nor authority to survive without such 
support[124]  
  
Such a state of affairs did not mean however that the English Constitution was 
no longer a balanced Constitution, for although it was true that the Crown 
depended on the Commons, it was no less true that the Commons depended 
on the influence that the Crown exercised over them either directly or through 
the Ministers. Hume wrote that the Crown had so many charges at its 
disposition that as long as it could count with the support of the honest and 
disinterested elements of the House, it would always dominate its resolutions, at 
least in sufficient measure to free from danger the traditional constitution. For 
that reason Hume held that the royal influence was essential to maintain the 
mixed and balanced character of the constitution. This was a thesis that 
Walpole had been defending since 1721 against all those, like Bollinbroke, that 
accused him of monopolising power and destroying the basis of the Constitution. 
Hume wrote that such influence could be given any name of one's choosing; 
define it even as corruption or servitude; but it is to a certain degree and type 
inseparable from the Constitution's own nature and necessary for the 
maintenance of a mixed form of government. For that reason Hume concluded - 
citing Bollinbroke - instead of asserting in an inflexible manner that the 
dependency of Parliament was, to a certain degree, an infraction of British 
liberties, the party of the nation must have made certain concessions to its 
adversaries and limit itself to examine which was the most convenient degree of 
dependency, further than which it becomes dangerous for liberty[125]  
  
In any case, it is appropriate to insist that Hume, more than interested in who 
was the sovereign, was concerned as to how sovereignty was exercised. This 
was a point of coherent departure not only with his own liberalism but also with 
his own most profound philosophical prepositions and, above all, with his theory 
of the origin and legitimacy of the State. Assuming the State, what was really 
important was to defend the most adequate form of government - or, if we 
prefer, the most useful - to vertebrate the rule of law or, to put it in different 
words, a government of laws, not of men[126] with the aim of ensuring in a 
constant and orderly manner the exercise of liberty. His attention was then not 
centred in the doctrine of sovereignty but in the theory of the State of Law. A 
State based as much on the principle of legality - that is, in the submission to 
general and uniform laws, previously known by the different branches and by all 
the subjects[127] - as in the division of powers and, very particularly, in the 
independence of the judges, given that Hume coinciding in this respect with 
Locke, understood that the whole machinery of government had, ultimately, no 
other motive than the administration of justice[128]  
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4.2. William Blackstone's ambivalent attitude  
 
Following a series of conferences given in Oxford in the mid 1750s', William 
Blackstone published his Commentaries on the Laws of England between 1765 
and 1769[129] In this work - of enormous success, not only with jurists but even 
among the educated public of the times[130] - Blackstone outlined a complete 
overview of the English juridical order. Something that only Bracton had tried to 
do previously before him, as F.W. Maitland recalls[131]  
  
It is important to underline that Blackstone was a jurist highly gifted for the 
exegesis and exposition of norms. Nobody did both in the England of his period 
quite like him despite being the epitome as a juridical century in that country, 
but he lacked the talent for theoretical or dogmatic construction, as it becomes 
obvious when he reflects on the concept of sovereignty.  
  
Blackstone coincides with Hume in criticising Locke's dualism between the 
supremacy of Parliament and popular sovereignty, but he could not escape it. 
Contrary to what had taken place with Hume who had defended his doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in a coherent and penetrating critique of traditional 
jus-naturalism as well as Locke's rationalist variety, Blackstone tried to defend 
Parliamentary sovereignty without breaking with jus-naturalism, particularly the 
traditional form to which in reality he remained attached. In effect the English 
jurist, after denying the existence of the state of nature as a notion too coarse to 
be taken seriously[132] repeatedly stated that the original contract subscribed 
between the people and the King from premises was closer to the Aquina's 
notion of the pactum subectionis than that of a true social pact defended by 
rationalist jus-naturalism and specifically by Locke.  
  
In Blackstone's judgement the revolution of 1688 had brought up to date and 
legalised this contract so that disputes around its content - and even those 
regarding its very existence - would cease. This contract subsisted and through 
it the English people had imposed on the Monarch a composite of duties, the 
principal and first of which was to govern its people according to law[133] A duty 
that the English jurist, no doubt influenced by Mostesquieu, considered innate to 
'the Constitution of our Germanic ancestors in the continent'[134] In reality - 
Blackstone added - the limitation of royal authority was a principal essential to 
all the gothic systems of government established in Europe, although it was 
slowly eliminated by violence and fraud in the majority of continental 
kingdoms[135]  
  
The duty of governing the people in accordance with the law was established in 
the common law and was reaffirmed in the oath of coronation. The English jurist 
added that this duty - that had its correlation in the loyalty of the subjects to the 
King - had been affirmed numerous times from the days of Bracton, who had 
insisted - Blackstone recalls - in that it was the law that made the king and not 
the reverse, in addition to distinguishing with great clarity, as Fortescue, 
between an absolute or despotic monarchy - established through conquests or 
violence - and a civil or political monarchy, such as the English, based on the 
consent of the governed[136]  
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Blackstone returned to refer to the original contract and to defend, always 
implicitly, the right to resist and the resumption of sovereignty by the people 
when he pointed out that if a future prince was intent in subverting the 
Constitution breaking the original contract between the King and the people, it 
would be legitimate for future generations - making use of the inherent although 
latent powers of society that no period, Constitution or contract could destroy or 
diminish - to force the King to abdicate, as it had happened in 1688 with James 
II[137] Shortly afterwards he justified the extraordinary recourse to the first 
principles when the social contracts are in danger of dissolution and a state of 
violence, fraud and oppression is established, which appears to be a cautious 
and elliptical defence of the right to resist in the face of tyrannical power or, as 
he says, he who acted outside of the established law[138]  
  
However Blackstone left aside these jus-naturalist statements - certainly 
traditional - and the belated allusion to popular sovereignty when he 
commented on Locke's passage in the Second Treatise on Civil Government in 
which he held that the permanency of sovereignty in the people following the 
social pact and, therefore, its capacity to depose parliament when it acted in a 
manner contrary to the trust that the people had deposited in it. Blackstone's 
opinion leaves no doubt: in his judgement the conclusion extracted by Locke 
could be accepted in theory but never in practice given that there was no 
juridical process to put it into effect within the current order. He added that this 
devolution of power to the people implied the general dissolution of the form of 
government established by the people itself. And he concluded, accordingly, 
that as long as the current English Constitution remained in place it could be 
confirmed that the power of parliament was absolute and not subject to any 
controls[139]  
  
In reality Blackstone expressly shows his discrepancy with Locke's 
interpretation of the 1688 revolution. In his judgement, the Convention that had 
been at the forefront of this revolution - which without doubt had opened a new 
era - had shown itself in favour of deposing James II for having subverted the 
Constitution, but without in any way accepting that the deviate conduct of the 
King implied a total dissolution of the State, as Locke had sustained, coinciding 
in this point with the 'extremists and visionary theories of some republicans'. 
Blackstone added that if Locke's arguments had succeeded society would 
reduced itself to an almost a state of nature; distinctions due to honour, rank, 
profession and property would disappear; sovereign power would have been 
annihilated and with it all legal doctrine which would have meant to leave in the 
hands of the people the freedom of building a new system of state upon a new 
foundation of polity[140]  
  
What was then the function of the people according to the English Constitution?. 
Blackstone doesn't hesitate to answer 'to elect its representatives', that is, the 
members of the House of Commons[141] A branch of legislative power which - 
as Smith and Hooker had held a century and a half earlier - was represented as 
a whole in the social body[142] in such a way that the members of this House 
although elected for a particular district represented the kingdom as a whole, 
without being subject to the orders of their electors with whom they didn't even 
have to consult or take advice from unless they thought it prudent to do so[143]  
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It should be taken into account that Blackstone defines the State (although in 
some instances he refers to 'government') as a collective body made up of 
individuals united for their security and convenience with the object of acting 
together as a single man for which it was required to work through a uniform 
will[144] which was the Parliament.  
 
In short, Blackstone appears at times in favour of the people's sovereignty and 
consequently, of their right to resist the tyrant, but in other instances, more often, 
holds the subordination of the people to the decisions of the sovereign 
Parliament. This attitude - which would deserve the criticism of writers in the 
recently created United States of America, such as James Wilson[145] - was 
certainly weak from an intellectual or philosophical point of view. But Blackstone 
was not a philosopher, not even a legal philosopher. He was a jurist. A jurist for 
whom the problems of the origin and the legitimacy of power, of the sovereignty 
of the right to resist, were embarrassing, and compromising. He did not dare to 
avoid them but nor could he face them with ease or convincingly. His 
ambivalent attitude can be summarised as this: if the people originally held the 
sovereignty, it continues to keep it after each actualisation of the contract with 
the King and, accordingly, after the adjustment of 1688, so that the people can 
validate its power before the King and compel him to abdicate when he 
breaches the contract, as it happened during the glorious revolution. However 
Blackstone now says that almost a century has elapsed since that date with the 
people of England enjoying their liberties. What is important now, and above all 
for a jurist occupied with the positive existent order, is not to get lost in 
philosophical arguments regarding the origin of power and the right to resist, 
which future generations will 'judge as they consider appropriate', but to 
remember that hic et nunc the sovereign, the only sovereign, the true sovereign, 
is Parliament. To start from this point is true constitutional law, the rest is 
juridical philosophy or, what is worse, demagogy and incitement to anarchy, to 
the subversion of the existing order of which the English are so proud and that 
evokes such envy among the other nations of the European Continent that have 
been incapable of retaining their Germanic or gothic heritage, that 'spirit of 
freedom' inherent to that heritage, allowing that the Kings dominate their 
peoples.  
 
But what was Parliament and who made up its composition? Blackstone replied 
by stating that it was a corporation, a body or aggregate politic, comprising the 
Monarch, the Lords and the Commons[146] In this respect it is necessary to 
take into account that the position adopted by Blackstone regarding the 
organisation of the powers is characterised by its fidelity to the doctrine of the 
mixed State although - as it had taken place earlier with Hume and Bollinbroke - 
with the add-on conceptions of Locke of constitutional balance and the 
separation of powers, this last one filtered by the ideas of Montesquieu, who 
made him recognise an independent judicial power[147]  
 
According to such principles Blackstone points out that the British Constitution 
combined the three pure forms of government, the monarchy, the aristocracy 
and democracy, which were respectively embodied in the King, the House of 
Lords and the House of Commons, that is, in the three parts of that body politic 
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or corporation called the British Parliament, in which sovereignty resided. 
Blackstone added that if the supreme power resided in any of the three parts 
separately it would be exposed to the inconveniences of an absolute Monarchy, 
of the aristocracy or democracy, without it being advisable that power resided 
without any one of these three parts. If for example it resided in the King and 
the House of Lords, the laws could well be well drafted and executed but they 
would not always have the people as their aim; if it resided in the King and the 
Commons it would need that circumspection and caution that only the wisdom 
of Pairs provide; lastly if the supreme power resided in the two Houses of 
Parliament to the exclusion of the King it would be to tempt the abolition of 
royalty or to debilitate or even to totally destroy the strength of executive 
power[148]  
 
It was then in Parliament, as a corporation or body composed of King, Lords 
and Commons where the supreme and absolute power of the State resided in 
England, and - consequently - the legislative power[149] given that the most 
relevant characteristic of sovereignty was precisely that of law making, to the 
extent that sovereignty and legislative power were synonymous terms; one 
could not exist without the other[150] The creation of laws - being really 
sovereign - could be limited neither for reason of the subject matter nor of the 
people involved. Parliament, he added, had uncontrolled and sovereign 
authority in making, confirming, widening, restricting, derogating, cancelling, 
reviving and interpreting the laws or the rights regarding matters of any kind, 
whether temporal or ecclesiastical, civil, military, maritime or criminal. Being so, 
the place where the absolute and despotic power - which must reside 
somewhere for all governments - was established in these Kingdoms [UK] in the 
British Parliament[151]  
 
By virtue of its sovereignty Parliament could regulate or re-establish the 
succession of the Crown, as it had during the reigns of Henry VIII and William III, 
or to alter the established religion of the country, as it was done on several 
instances during the reigns of King Henry VIII and his three children, or even to 
change and re-establish the Constitution of the Kingdom and Parliament itself 
as it did through the Act of Union of 1707, and the different laws that regulated 
elections every three to seven years. Parliament could do everything that is not 
naturally impossible; for that reason - he argued - some had audaciously, and 
without scruples spoken of the omnipotence of Parliament[152]  
  
The sovereignty of Parliament was then manifested above all in the passing of 
laws. A rule which - at the same time - reflected the highest authority that the 
Kingdom recognised on earth. When a law was properly approved - that is, with 
the consent of its three component parts, the King, the Lords and the Commons 
- it compelled all the inhabitants of the country and its dominions, including the 
King himself, without it being able to be altered, added-on, dispensed with, 
suspended or rejected other than through the same formalities and under the 
same authority that approved it[153]  
  
However, conceiving Parliamentary sovereignty in such an absolute and 
unlimited manner, Blackstone fell in a new and no less important contradiction. 
In this case in respect of what he had held in the second part of the introduction 
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to the Commentaries titled 'Of the Nature of Laws in General'. Here, in effect, 
the English jurist had recognised the existence of a natural right, inspired in the 
divine right, that had to serve as the parameter to the positive law, so that it 
could not be in any way contradicted. Blackstone wrote that the natural right, 
dictated by God himself, was, of course, superior to any other right. It links and 
compels all nations and at all times; no human law is valid if it contradicts it; and 
the validity, strength and authority of human laws derive, directly or indirectly 
from the natural law[154] A thesis that is completely irreconcilable with his 
rotund affirmation of parliamentary sovereignty.  
  
We can say that this traditional jus-naturalist conception, did not stop 
Blackstone from appealing to the natural rights of man, reclaimed by rationalist 
jus-naturalism so much in vogue in his day. Blackstone, mixing premises 
originating in one or another jus-naturalist school, understood that the natural 
rights of people derive from a immutable natural law[155] and, following Locke, 
argued that the most important aim of a society organised in a State was the 
protection of these rights[156] which he, again agreeing with Locke, reduces to 
three: the right to personal security, to personal liberty and to private 
property[157]  
  
Such a starting point explains that Blackstone examined the constitutional 
organisation of the State within the framework of a book, the first of his 
'Commentaries', dedicated to the rights of peoples, the first chapter of which 
was titled 'of the absolute rights of individuals'. Blackstone's reflections on the 
General Theory of Law lacked not only originality but also - what was always 
much worse - intellectual rigour. Ernest Barker has even said that they were no 
more than a confused mix of Locke and Mostesquieu with writers from the 
school of natural law such as Puffendorf and Burlanlaqui, whose principal merit 
was the negative one of having contributed to the creation, as a reaction, of the 
analytical school of law, represented by Bentham and Austin[158] This same 
author, referring to the opposition between the theses argued by Blackstone in 
the 'Introduction' (supremacy of Natural Law) and the First Book (Parliamentary 
Sovereignty), recalls that a reader of the Commentaries could opt - at his 
election - for his doctrine on sovereignty that George III and the British 
parliament used in their cause against the American colonies, or for his doctrine 
of Natural Law and the natural rights to life, liberty and happiness, to which 
Jefferson called upon against Great Britain in the US Declaration of 
Independence[159]  
  
Blackstone felt more comfortable reflecting on the Law from a historical 
perspective than from a philosophical one, from the specific to the abstract. It is 
for that reason that in his Commentaries he attempts to transform the debate 
regarding the natural rights of men into an exposition on the historical rights of 
Englishmen[160] Blackstone himself expressly recalled that the absolute rights 
of the English are usually called their freedoms. Freedoms that being founded in 
nature and in reason were simultaneously inherent to the English style of 
government[161] being recognised as much by the statutes approved by 
Parliament - from the Magna Carta to the Establishment Act - as by the 
common law[162] Two types of juridical rules, on which he expands in section 
III of the Introduction, titled 'Of the Laws of England'.  
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Blackstone recognised the major quantitative importance that the common law 
had in the English order of his day which he defined - in one instance - as that 
old collection of unwritten maxims and customs[163] the most significant source 
of which were judicial decisions. Blackstone observed that the judges were the 
repositories of the law, the living oracles that must decide in all doubtful cases 
and who are obliged by oath to resolve in accordance with the law of the land. 
Their knowledge of that law followed from experience and study and for being 
accustomed over many years to know the judgements of their 
predecessors[164]  
 
The mechanism that allowed the continuity and the authority of the common law 
was precedent. It was true that the judge was at times required to revise it, but 
even in such cases judges did not purport to make new law, but to liberate the 
old from its incorrect interpretation, that is, new judicial decisions were limited to 
outlining that the original norm was not 'bad law', but simply 'no law'[165] As 
Stanley Latz suggests, Blackstone conceived the judge as a law-finder rather 
than a law-maker[166]  
 
However the fact that he recognised the major quantitative importance of the 
common law over the law of the Parliament does not make him hold the 
primacy of the former over the latter, as Edward Coke had made and at times 
followed - as in the famous and celebrated case of Bonham in 1610. On the 
contrary, Blackstone argued that when the common law and statute differed, the 
former submits to the latter, but unless the contradiction could not be solved, 
the validity of both should be maintained[167] On the other hand Blackstone 
points out that no statute could be considered beyond reform by Parliament 
given that since Parliament was in reality the sovereign power, it is always 
equal in power and absolute authority, so that it could never be bound to the 
laws approved by the current or any preceding Parliaments[168]  
  
On the basis of these premises it was not possible to accept the possibility that 
judges would control or annul parliamentary legislation when Parliament 
breached natural law, the common law or statute law. In Blackstone's 
judgement there was no constitutional backing for the idea that a law contrary to 
reason was invalid. He argued that if Parliament decided that something 
unreasonable be done then he didn't know of any power within the Constitution 
that was vested with the authority to control it[169] Concerning specifically 
judges, Blackstone added that if the freedom of the judge to reject a law of 
Parliament contrary to reason was admitted, it would place judicial power above 
legislative power which, as he understood it, would subvert any form of 
government[170]  
  
Nevertheless Blackstone softened these statements by holding that when the 
execution of the laws approved by Parliament becomes impossible or when 
they resulted in absurd consequences or contrary to common reason, judges, 
starting from the basis that such effects and consequences were not predicted 
by parliament, then they had freedom to interpret such laws in accordance with 
equity[171] The English jurist added that there were in England, as well, Courts 
of Equity, competent solely in property related matters, without at any stage 
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being able to pronounce themselves in matters of a penal nature, subjected to a 
strict principle of legality[172] Without doubt Equity - made up of ethical or 
conscience rules was in Blackstone's judgement, necessary to moderate the 
rigour of judicial rules or to adapt them to the circumstances of the time and 
place, as Grotius had warned and whom he cites, but adding that it was 
necessary to be very cautious in resorting to equity in order not to destroy the 
law[173] He added that the law without equity, although hard and unpleasant, 
was made much less unpleasant for the common good than equity without law, 
which could convert every judge into a legislator and introduce much 
confusion[174]  
 
But together with the unsalvageable contradictions perceived in Blackstone 
when he confirmed at times the sovereignty of the people, as when he holds the 
absolute freedom of the people to approve laws and, at the same time, the 
primacy of Natural Law, it is required to add that this writer at times referred to 
the Monarch as sovereign. It is also appropriate to take into account that in the 
Commentaries - very particularly in chapters VII and VIII of the First Book[175] - 
is to be found the best summary of the juridical statutes of the English Monarch 
since the days of Bracton. In these chapters Blackstone examined the position 
of the Monarch, at the time George III, in accordance with the law approved by 
the Parliament and with the common law. This last one a law interpreted and 
brought up-to-date by the judges, that Parliament had no derogated, and 
through which a substantial proportion of royal competencies had been 
delimited, particularly those known as [royal] prerogatives, over which 
Blackstone himself expanded, demonstrating a great mastery in mixing judicial 
and historical rigours[176]  
  
Blackstone shows how by reason of the prerogative power the Monarch 
enjoyed a group of residual powers - which later would be called reserved 
powers - that Parliament had that for the monarch to retain. From a functional 
perspective these powers were not only of an executive character - although 
these were the most important - but also of a legislative nature as assent was 
additional to the royal prerogative and, accordingly, the veto or the ability to 
reject parliamentary proposals[177] In reality for Blackstone, the King of 
England continued being not only the chief but also the magistrate of the nation, 
to whom all the other organs of the State had to submit themselves. He added 
that in a certain way - as it happened under the great revolution of the Roman 
State - all the powers of the old Commonwealth had been concentrated in the 
new Emperor[178] In respect of Parliament, the Monarch was 'caput, principium, 
et finis', since apart from participating in the laws by means of assent it was his 
duty to call and dissolve the two houses of parliament[179]  
  
It was then a conception of regal power that - as A.V. Dicey would recall - 
although against Constitutional reality, it was common to all the jurists of the 
time who had the custom of using old terms to designate new institutions[180]  
  
What was the reason for the divorce between the Blackstonian conception of 
regal power and constitutional reality ? To the forgetfulness of constitutional 
conventions. In effect the English professor - when considering the position of 
the king focused only in his judicial position - delimited as much by 
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parliamentary law as by the common law, but on the other hand it didn't take 
into account the political position of the king, regulated by constitutional 
conventions cemented since the revolution of 1688.  
 
This starting point explains why Blackstone speaks that the participation of the 
monarch in the legislative function had become in a mere formality, as Hume 
had written in his essay on the independence of Parliament. But above all this 
starting point explains why he makes no reference in the four volumes of his 
work at all to Cabinet or to the mechanisms to demand the political 
responsibility before the two Houses of Parliament.. Mechanisms very different 
to the impeachment, the process to demand penal responsibility to which 
Blackstone referred[181]  
 
The re-establishment of Hume's theses in the work of William Paley A notable 
work was published in 1785: The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 
Its author was William Paley, an Anglican priest, born in 1743 and Archdeacon 
of Carlisle[182] Paley drafted his 'Principles' following conferences given at 
Cambridge University, from which he had graduated [Christ's College] in 1763 
and of which he would later become tutor and fellow[183]  
  
In this work, particularly in his Book VI titled 'Elements of Political Knowledge' 
Paley studied the most relevant aspects of political and constitutional theory of 
the 18th century. Hume's influence is quite palpable specially when he faces the 
problem of the origin of society and the State, which in his opinion was found in 
patriarchal authority or in military imposition[184] never in a social contract as 
so many writers had maintained, at the head of which it was necessary to 
mention the 'venerable' Locke[185] Whether such a contract was considered as 
a 'fact' or as a 'fiction'[186] that is, whether its historical existence was affirmed 
or whether it was accepted as a mere hypothesis, the idea of a social contract - 
above being false - was unnecessary to give account of the origin and nature of 
society and public power[187] The conclusions extracted from the idea of the 
social contract were also dangerous, as it happened with the acknowledgement 
of a fundamental legislation by an Assembly or popular Convention, superior to 
the legally constituted Parliament, and in which certain rights were supposedly 
'inherent', 'inalienable' and 'permanent', the violation of which legitimised the 
right to rebel against the authority of the State[188]  
  
Briefly, as well as rejecting the notion of the social pact for intellectual reasons, 
Paley distrusted it for its proclivity to revolution or - although he didn't expressed 
it in these words - for being associated with Locke's old distinction between the 
sovereignty of the people and the supremacy of Parliament - as it had been 
made evident during the then recently emancipated English Colonies in 
America, an experience that Paley had clearly in mind while drafting the 
'Principles', and as it would happen a few years later in France. As an 
alternative to this jus-rationalist doctrine, Paley - again following Hume - 
defended the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty and recalled that in 
England no law approved could be declared unconstitutional, given that in that 
country the terms constitutional and unconstitutional meant nothing else except 
legal and illegal[189] This was something he considered advisable given that it 
allowed that the most politically relevant laws, as those in respect of the prince's 
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family, the successive order, the Prerogative of the Crown, the form and 
structure of the legislature, together with their respective powers, as well as its 
organisation, duration and mutual dependency of its constituting parts - 
although deserving of deferent treatment - were modified by Parliament in the 
same manner as the other laws, when convenience or utility would require 
it[190]  
 
These laws, and others no less important as those related to the organisation 
and operation of the Administration of Justice, formed the British Constitution 
the sources of which were - in addition to the laws or statutes approved by 
parliament, the decisions of the tribunals and customary use from times 
immemorial[191] This Constitution articulated a mixed state or what was in 
effect the same, a limited monarchy which combined three types of government: 
monarchy, aristocracy and the republic, each one of them respectively 
represented by the King, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The 
goodness of this mixed form consisted in uniting the advantages of the three 
individual forms whilst excluding their inconveniences.  
  
Some advantages and some disadvantages that Paley analysed later in detail 
outlining a brilliant synthesis of the doctrine of the mixed and balanced 
constitution (in the judgement of M.J.C. Vile, the most penetrating of his 
century),[192] although by then this doctrine had little to do with constitutional 
reality, given the notable development that the parliamentary system of 
government had reached and of which Paley was aware[193] particularly after 
the dismissal of Lord North in 1782.  
 
 
V. FROM BENTHAM TO DICEY  
 
5.1. Jeremy Bentham and the sovereignty of the electoral body  
 
The works of Jeremy Bentham became known during the last third of the 18th 
century and the first third of the 19th, one of the most singular and influential 
figures of his day. His first book was 'A Fragment on Government', published in 
1776, when Bentham was only 28 years old, and which advanced a good 
proportion of the key ideas of utilitarian philosophy, which he would defend 
throughout his expansive life. This book was a type of adjustment of accounts 
with William Blackstone - his old teacher from Oxford and whose law 
lecturers[194] he had attended in 1763 - and to who he would also dedicate 
another book, 'A Comment on the Commentaries', which would remain 
unpublished until 1928[195] His obsession with the work of Blackstone - in 
Bentham's opinion as influential and just as plagued with conformism, topics 
and contradictions - lasted his whole life, to the point that at the very end he 
was working on a book, which he never finished titled 'A Familiar View of 
Blackstone: or say Blackstone Familiarised'[196]  
 
Bentham headed his Fragment on Government with a phrase extracted from 
Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws (specifically from chapter XV, Book XXX), that 
in the plume of the young English thinker became an acid reference to 
Blackstone's 'Commentaries': rien ne recule plus le progrés des connaissance 
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qu'un mauvais ouvrage d'un auteur celébre: parce qu'avant d'instruire, il faut 
commencer par d'etromper'. What Bentham could not support was the self-
complacent analysis that Blackstone had made of the English judicial order, 
which was so well summarised in the oft repeated phrase by Blackstone 
'everything is as it should be'. Bentham reproaches his old teacher not to have 
been able to distinguish between juridical dogma and legislative policy or, in his 
own terminology, between expositive and critical jurisprudence, which had 
made him confused between what the law was and what it should be. The last 
point was in reality what concerned Bentham and what would continue to worry 
him later on, given that he never attempted to outlay the current order but 
instead to substantially reform it, not only the English system but every other 
than did not fit utilitarian ideas. As Bentham himself said, he was not an 
expositor of the Law, as Blackstone had been, but a censor .." As Bentham 
explained in the preface to A Fragment on Government, the duty of the 
expositor is to explain to us what the law is; the censor's is to indicate to us 
what he believes what the law ought to be. For that reason the expositor, mainly, 
busies himself determining or inquiring the facts; the censor in discussing the 
reasons. The being of the Law is entirely different in different countries, while 
the must be is very similar. For that reason the expositor a citizen of one 
country or another, while the censor is or must be a citizen of the world[197]  
  
In his first work the young Bentham agreed that in Great Britain sovereignty 
resided in Parliament and even that it was there that it still lay. His opinion was 
then not too different in that with that held by David Hume - to whom Bentham's 
utilitarian philosophy owes so much - or even from what Edmund Burke was 
saying at the time, an author who had defended the purely representative 
character of the mandate of the members of the House of Commons in his 
celebrated "Bristol Address" in 1774 with arguments brilliantly presented, 
although not entirely original since they were already present in the works of 
Smith and Hooker and in an explicit form in the Commentaries of Blackstone 
himself[198]  
  
On the question of sovereignty Bentham even agreed with Blackstone in 
pointing out the danger that meant for Parliament that its acts and laws could be 
annulled by the judges: he argued that giving the judges the power to annul the 
Acts of Parliament would transfer the supreme power of the assembly in the 
election of which the people had had at least some participation, to a group of 
men in the election of which they had not participated at all[199] On the other 
hand what Bentham did not tolerate was the ambiguous and contradictory 
return of his old and reviled teacher to the contractual theses. In reality the 
dominant preoccupation in Fragment on Government was to reject the 
fundamental subjects that served as the basis to Whig doctrine, and especially 
the fiction of the original contract[200] Bentham, in effect referring to Blackstone, 
wrote that in respect of the original contract, alternatively defended and ridiculed 
by Bentham, it could have been worthwhile to dedicate some pages to reach a 
precise notion regarding its utility and reality. The fact that in times past 
Blackstone had called attention upon himself made him deserving of being 
taken into account. For his part, Bentham wrote that he believed until he 
became aware of the Blackstone's reference, that such an argument had been 
demolished by Hume, believing that the contract was not talked about as much 
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as it had been earlier and that the indisputable prerogatives of humanity did not 
need to be founded in the shaky foundations of a fiction[201]  
  
Bentham also made fun in this work of the laudatory and already antiquated 
interpretation that Blackstone had made of the British Monarchy as a mixed and 
balanced Monarchy based on the independence of the King, the Lords and the 
Commons. An interpretation that Edmund Burke had put in circulation very 
incisively in 'Thoughts on the Cause on the Present Discontents' a work that 
published in 1707[202] Bentham made clear, as Burke had done before him, 
that the King and the two Houses, far from being three organs or parts entirely 
independent, as Blackstone had argued - partly distancing himself from Hume - 
were closely interconnected; he wrote to the effect that those who considered 
the influence that the King and many Lords exercised over the election of the 
members of the House of Commons, the power that the King has to dissolve, 
that House just with a simple warning,; those who considered the influence that 
the King holds over both Chambers by means of the bestowing of royal honours 
and appointments and their destitution; those who on the other hand considered 
that the King depended on his sustenance on both Houses, but above all on the 
Commons (not to mention the many other circumstances which could be 
pointed out) could judge the veracity of Blackstone's opinions when he so 
emphatically made such assertions[203]  
 
In a brief work published in 1795 titled Anarchical Fallacies, which only 
achieved great distribution in England and Continental Europe after it was 
translated into French by Etienne Dumont in 1816[204] Bentham, addressing 
himself now to French revolutionaries, again criticised the doctrines of popular 
sovereignty (or more precisely national sovereignty) and the division of powers 
that Tom Paine - the most conspicuous English representative in the doctrines 
of the French revolutionaries[205] - had defended in his very influential book 
'The Rights of Man' published in 1791[206] Paine, who in 1776 had given to the 
printer a work highly critical of the British Constitutional system titled 'Common 
Sense'[207] held now, openly against Burke's "Reflections on the French 
Revolution" that in order to guarantee the natural rights of man it was necessary 
to create a Constitutional State inspired in popular or national sovereignty and 
in a rigid division of powers, as the Americans had done with the Constitution of 
1787 and the French with the Declaration of Rights of 1789 and the 1791 
Constitution. It is for that reason that he rejected a Constitution along British 
lines based on parliamentary sovereignty of which an hereditary King and 
aristocratic Lords formed part, and not in the sovereignty of the people or the 
nation to whom it belonged at all times the inherent and non-derogatory right to 
abolish any form of government that it considers inconvenient , and to establish 
what was convenient to its interests and happiness[208] A Constitution which 
mixed system of government was an imperfect whole, the discordant parts of 
which could only be fused through corruption[209]  
  
Bentham detested as much as Paine did Burke's romantic historical perspective 
and his doctrine of the 'prescriptive constitution' based on precedent, prejudice 
and historical continuity, but just like Burke, perhaps even more so, he detested 
Paine's Rousseau-influenced rationalist jus-naturalism. His theses on 
sovereignty and the organisation of the powers of the State were for that reason, 
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very different from Paine's, and would remain that way even when Bentham 
embraced the democratic ideal, as we shall see soon.  
  
Regarding the doctrine of sovereignty - glossing over the third article of the 
celebrated Declarations of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, approved by the 
French Constituting Assembly on the 26 August 1789, in which it was 
proclaimed that sovereignty resided essentially in the Nation and that, 
consequently, no corporation nor individual can exercise other authority not 
derived from it - Bentham argued that - at least in a general manner, as the 
article did - it was unsustainable to hold that the authority not founded in a 
popular election, in an expressed mandate of the nation, was an usurping 
authority contrary to natural law and therefore null, since that would mean 
considering as usurpers and null all then existing governments, except 'some 
democratic republics'. The maxim that contained this article was then 'an 
instrument of revolution'.[210] No doubt an incorrect interpretation given that the 
same people that approved this article did not refrain from creating a hereditary 
monarchy.  
  
In respect of the doctrine of the division of powers Bentham argued that in a 
State there must be a sovereign power, such that rather than argue for a 
division of powers it was preferable to speak of a division of functions. 
Commenting on article 16 of the French Declaration of Rights, Bentham pointed 
out that the separation of powers that this article consecrated as an essential 
principle of every Constitution, was a confused idea extracted from an old 
political maxim: Divide et impera 1/4 The powers, separated and independent, 
did not form part in any way an entity. A State so constituted could not survive. 
If a supreme power was necessary to which all branches of government were 
subordinated, there had to be distinctions in the functions but there would be no 
division of powers, since a power that is not exercised except in accordance 
with the rules drawn up by a superior is not a separated power, it is a branch of 
that superior power, and has been granted by virtue of that fact, which can also 
recover it; such as it has been determined by the manner of its exercise, it can 
also modify that form as it pleases.[211]  
 
But this first Bentham period - characterised by a conservative positivism, 
reformist and anti-revolutionary - was followed by a second characterised by a 
democratic positivism, obvious above all in the 'Constitutional Code'[212] where 
his thesis concerning sovereignty - although not about the division of powers - 
changed substantially. In the Constitutional Code - his most important work 
according to many students of the English philosophers[213] and with ever 
increasing interest in it[214] - Bentham, in the final stretch of his life, in effect 
moved away from the traditional doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, showing 
himself in favour of popular sovereignty although without abandoning his 
positivist premises, which to such an extent separated him from Paine, fellow 
democrat but jus-naturalist.  
  
The gestation process of the Constitutional Code was very complicated. 
Bentham commenced drafting it in 1822 when he was almost 74 years old. 
Death caught up with him ten years later without completing it, although the first 
volume appeared in 1830, the only one that saw light during his life, with the title 
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'Constitutional Code: for the use of All Nations and All Governments professing 
Liberal Opinions'.[215] Bentham argued the principle of popular sovereignty at 
the beginning of the Constitutional Code[[216] although from purely positivist 
and utilitarian assumptions that would take him to substitute the always abstract 
notion of 'people' by the much more specific of 'Constituting Authority', 
composed by citizens to whom the order conferred an active electoral right, that 
is, all males over the age of 21 able to read.[217] The people so understood 
was the repository of sovereignty, not only its title but also a good proportion of 
its exercise given that, for example, it was its responsibility to elect the 
Legislative Assembly.[218]  
  
Reasoning in this manner Bentham distinguished between popular sovereignty 
and Parliamentary supremacy, between the Constituting Authority and the 
Legislature. Parliament ought to be an omni-competent but not an omnipotent 
organ and consequently subject not to limits but rather to a number of 
controls.[219] In this respects he defended the revocation of Parliament at the 
initiative of a quarter of the electors, who could also destitute the members of 
the executive and the judiciary and demand from them their responsibilities 
through the Legislation Penal Judicatory.[220] On the other hand in the 
Constitutional Code Bentham remained faithful to his old critique of the doctrine 
of the division of powers which he classified as absurd. He also insisted in the 
need to substitute the idea of 'division' for 'dependency' of the different powers 
of the State to the entity elected by the people, although in a line much closer to 
that of an assembly system of government than that of a parliamentary system. 
In reality, in the model argued by Bentham in this work - after the electorate - 
Parliament was configured as the central entity of the State, to which all other 
entities, and specially the executive, had to be subordinate.  
  
In effect parliament had to designate a Prime Minister, which in any case should 
not be called President, as in the United States, despite that country 
representing the constitutional model to which Bentham felt a closer affinity. 
However the Prime Minister was not to be a member of Parliament and did not 
even have access to it except through express invitation, so that he 
communicated with Parliament in writing, having to exhaustively inform the 
Assembly on every activity of government. On the other hand the Prime Minister 
could be dismissed by Parliament, although Bentham does not explicitly 
mention either censure motions or votes of confidence. Likewise he could be 
dismissed by the people, that is, the electors. The main function that Bentham 
conferred on the Prime Minister was to execute the orders of Parliament, to 
name and allocate Ministers and to direct the civil and military 
administration.[221] For their part Ministers had voice but no vote in Parliament, 
being capable of being dismissed by the Parliament and by the people as well 
as by the Prime Minister.[222]  
 
The theses argued by Bentham in the Constitutional Code was then very far 
from the English Constitutional reality of the day and that which would evolve in 
the future, although they would not fall on deaf ears. On the contrary, his 
influence would be substantial among the critics of democracy argued by the 
British left during the last one hundred and fifty years.  
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5.2. John Austin and the House of Commons as trustee of the electorate  
 
One of the most profound reflections on sovereignty in the history of British 
thought was undertaken by John Austin in a book published for the first time in 
1832, the same year in which the Reform Act was approved, that would so 
much influenced the advance of the Cabinet system of government and even of 
democracy itself in Great Britain. This book - 'The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined' - included the text from a series of conferences that Austin had 
been delivering since 1829 in the then recently created University of 
London.[223] The influence of Hobbes and Bentham is clearly perceptible 
through its pages. Of course Austin moved away from the author of Leviatham 
on some essential points as, for example, in everything relating to the origin of 
power, but was not reticent in confessing that he knew of no posterior work 
'except our great contemporary Jeremy Bentham' that had formulated so many 
truths relating to the structure of the State and the most important juridical 
categories.[224] Bentham's influence over Austin was likewise notable, 
particularly in the field of juridical philosophy, give that in the political arena 
Austin's perspective was more conservative.[225]  
  
In his book Austin tackled with extraordinary rigour and in a very clear and 
precise style, some problems essential to understand the British system of 
government from a juridical perspective. It is certain that Austin's Seminars did 
not constitute a course in Constitutional Law. On the other hand and as its title 
implied, it was one in Jurisprudence, that is, of the General Theory of the 
Law.[226] For that reason he only examined in passing what in some instances 
he significantly called the intricate system known as the British Constitution.[227] 
This does not mean that the reflections of the great English jurist did not 
become very interesting in order to best encapsulate the British doctrine of 
sovereignty.  
  
Austin, following Bentham, understood that the aim of every political 
organisation, irrespective of its form of government, was to achieve the greatest 
possible advancement to human happiness[228] From this point of view, the 
State, as Locke had said, had to legitimise itself in the consent of the governed 
and only the people could be considered as the legitimate source of public 
order[229] However that did not imply acceptance of the contractual theory 
when it came around to explain the foundations of the State and its historical 
origins. More than that: the hypothesis of the social pact appeared to him 
unnecessary and prejudicial[230] As he understood it - coinciding with Hume 
and Bentham - it was not possible to speak of contract before the existence of 
law nor, therefore, of the State, in addition to which it became impossible to 
explain historically the existence of a social contract[231] The Constitution of 
each State and, accordingly, the form of government with which it was 
configured, were in reality the fruit of several generations and not the result of 
an original contract[232]  
  
One of the most peculiar forms of government was that known as "limited 
monarchy'. A form of government that could not be classified as monarchical 
but rather as aristocratic, since it was not one in which a single element 
exercised power but several. The king in a limited monarchy shared sovereignty 
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with others: for example with parliament. Strictly speaking the term 'limited 
monarchy' implied a contradiction in terms given that if it was a monarchy it 
could not be limited and if it was limited it could not be a monarchy. Where the 
king was not sovereign it made no sense to speak of a monarchy. Accordingly 
the so-called limited monarchy had to be considered as an aristocratic mode of 
government, but not monarchical, as Hobbes had made clear in Leviathan[233]  
  
The limited monarchy was precisely the form of government existent in England. 
It was there that the King shared power with the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons. The three entities together formed the Parliament, which is where 
sovereignty resided[234] Although in reality, for Austin the organ where 
sovereignty resided was not the House of Commons but the electoral body 
charged with its periodic election, together with the House of Lords and the King. 
That is, Austin points out that the King and the Lords together with the House of 
Commons formed a tripartite body which was sovereign or supreme. However - 
he added - that speaking with greater precision, the members of the House of 
Commons are but mere trustees of the electoral body that elected them and, 
consequently, sovereignty always resided in the King and the Lords together 
with the electoral body that elected the House of Commons[235]  
  
Austin was very critical of the doctrine of the division of powers, particularly with 
the distinction between the legislative and executive powers, just like it had 
been argued by other English writers such as Blackstone. For Austin to 
distinguish between the faculty of establishing laws or other juridical rules and 
the faculty of executing them was always very imprecise, among other reasons 
because what was understood by executive function (into which Austin included 
not only administrative but also judicial) implied or could imply the exercise of 
legislative functions. In reality Austin thought, as it was common in his time, that 
the doctrine of the division of powers - as argued by Blackstone and other 
celebrated writers during the 18th century - was so 'evidently false that its 
examination could not last more than a minute'. To prove its falsity Austin did 
not mention, as it was usual from Burke and Bentham, the narrow connection 
between Cabinet and the Commons in which Lord Russell and J.J. Park had 
insisted[236] instead preferring to recourse to other less abused examples. In 
that manner the great English jurist pointed out that many laws made by the 
British Parliament were subsidiary, that is they were thought for the proper 
execution of others, which meant that when the British Parliament made them it 
was not strictly speaking as a legislature but was instead carrying out executive 
functions, just as when the Justice Tribunals - in order to apply the law - issued 
rules of process in their sentences and warrants, that is, by means of orders 
issued for specific cases by the judiciary[237]  
  
Austin also observed that in Great Britain the judicial function was exercised 
directly by the Parliament when it approved an Act of Attainder with the aim of 
punishing a conduct ex post facto, that is, without prior legal classification[238] 
Lastly, it became evident for Austin that the King did not only exercise executive 
functions but also others of a legislative character, for example when - as 
Captain General - he drafted juridical rules with respect to the organisation of 
the military. In the same way that the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons carried out functions of a judicial nature - and therefore executive or 
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administrative - when the first, in civil cases, became the final Appeals Tribunal 
and the second made pronouncements over the validity or otherwise of the 
election of its members[239] Austin concluded stating that the most precise 
manner of looking at the organisation of the powers of the State consisted in 
distinguishing between supreme and subordinate powers. The formers were 
those exercised by the sovereign itself, which in England was no other than the 
King, the House of Lords and the electoral body charged with electing the 
Commons; the latter were those exercised by the delegated authorities acting in 
its name, as it happened with the Tribunals of Justice or even with the King, the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords, when these three entities did not 
function as part of the sovereign body, that is, of the Parliament, but as entities 
independent of Parliament[240]  
  
Austin distinguished between juridical and conventional rules in accordance 
with a purely positivist concept of law - inherited from Hobbes and Bentham - 
equivalent to the sovereign's mandate, who could directly established juridical 
rules (as it happened in England with the Acts) or through a subordinate 
authority (as with the judicial or judge-made law), or allowing juridical creation to 
private individuals such as in the field of private law[241] The juridical rules 
were only so when they could be argued before and enforced by the Courts. It 
is from this that the customs or conventions were not juridical rules but simply 
'rules of conduct' which expressed political, moral and ethical principles[242] 
These rules of conduct were enormously important for public English law in the 
measure that the public law concerned the sovereign it was clear that a large 
part of the law was not law as such but simply positive morality or ethical 
principles[243] This is what happened with the rules that determined the 
'Constitution of the State' or which determined the aims and procedures of 
public powers. Rules not juridical in the strictest sense, the knowledge of which 
was absolutely necessary in order to know the juridical rules per se, whether 
they were of parliamentary origin (statute laws) or judge-made (judiciary 
law)[244]  
  
In reality, in England, the law could not be understood without knowledge of the 
Parliamentary Constitution and of the different rules through which the body 
sovereign legislated, although it is obvious that a large portion of the rules that 
determined the Constitution of the Parliament as well as those others that 
parliament followed when legislating, were only a right imposed by community 
opinion or simple ethical maxims that Parliament willingly observed[245] that is, 
simple customs or conventions to which Austin denies their juridical nature 
proper not being required by Tribunals, or simply as rules of constitutional 
propriety.  
  
Austin maintained that it was a contradiction in terms to speak of limits to 
sovereignty. The sovereign could not be subject to juridical limits[246] Certainly 
in every politically independent society, that is, in every State, there are certain 
maxims that the sovereign habitually observes in its relationship with society. 
But such maxims are not, strictly speaking, law, that is, positive legality, but 
positive morality; they do not form part of the juridical order but of the 
constitutional order[247] It is then not possible to establish against the 
Sovereign, be it Parliament or the Monarch, 'legal' limits, only 'constitutional' 
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limits[248] In this manner Austin established the principal distinction (more like 
juxtaposition), in the heart of public English Law - particularly in respect of the 
study of the parliamentary monarchy - between 'legality' and 'constitutionality', 
that is, between juridical rules, created by parliament of Judges, and 
constitutional conventions. In that manner a law could, in his opinion, be 
unconstitutional but not for that reason 'illegal'[249] If, for example 'a law of the 
British Parliament attributed sovereignty upon the King, or to the King and the 
House of Lords, or the House of Commons, it would essentially alter the current 
structure of the State and could, consequently, be properly considered 
unconstitutional 1/4 But to call it illegal would be absurd, given that currently 
Parliament is sovereign in the United Kingdom and, accordingly, it is the source, 
directly and indirectly, of all the positive law, corresponding exclusively to it what 
it is that is juridically just and unjust'[250]  
  
But although it was not possible to establish juridical limits, only moral ones (or 
said it in another manner; constitutional limits but not legal ones) the sovereign, 
that is, Parliament in accordance with the English Constitution, this did not imply 
that taken by themselves the members of Parliament, be they the House of 
Lords, the Commons or the King, would cease being subject to the law , in 
addition to 'positive morality'. In what concerned the King, English law 
consecrated juridical and political irresponsibility on the Monarch, but that was 
no reason so that taken separately, he would be juridically and politically 
compelled, that is, in accordance with the law and the Constitution, to comply 
with and obey the laws approved by the Parliament as a whole, although the 
order could not prevent any sanction in case that it wouldn't comply with it[251]  
  
In an interesting study Sarah Austin confesses that her husband's book did not 
have too much impact[252] contrary to what had happened with the 
conferences on which it was based (that were not completely published until 
1861, together with a course that John Austin taught at the Inner Temple in 
1834) [253] Nevertheless Wilfrid E. Rumble recently showed that in Great 
Britain some juridical journals and others of a more general nature, immediately 
recounted Austin's book, its first edition in 1833 as much as the second in 1861 
[254] while on the other hand his lectures had not enjoyed too much 
success[255]  
  
What is beyond doubt is that Austin's reflections in 'The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined' had enormous influence in Anglo-Saxon juridical 
and political thought since at least the second half of last century. The echo that 
these reflections - in reality something more than an echo - can be seen, for 
example, in the 'Considerations on Representative Government', that John 
Stuart Mill[256] wrote in 1861, but its influence was particularly important in the 
work of Albert Venn Dicey, the most outstanding British writer of the 19th 
century, with whom we will deal now.  
 
5.3. Dicey and the distinction between juridical and political sovereignty  
 
Dicey is above all the author of a book that would have enormous repercussion 
in 20th century doctrine: his 'Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution', the first edition of which dates from 1885 [257] In this book it is not 
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only John Austin's decisive impact that can be seen, but also Bentham's and 
Hobbes, who in all justice can be considered the precursor of modern juridical 
positivism, without demeaning the stellar roles of Hume and Kant. Nevertheless 
this marked intellectual ascendancy was no reason for Dicey holding very 
distinctive theses to those held by Hobbes, Bentham or even Austin in respect 
of the subject of the imputation of sovereignty. It could be said that Dicey's 
position consisted in liberating Blackstone's theses regarding parliamentary 
sovereignty of all their contradictions with the assistance of the positivist 
methods and to adapt them to the juridical reality of the second half of the 19th 
century. As a result Dicey formulated a theory of sovereignty, not original but 
coherent, clear, precise and current; exposing as well great brilliance. Qualities 
that explain its subsequent success.  
 
With a firmness unknown until then Dicey held that in Great Britain - or in 
England as he preferred to say[258] - there was no sovereign other than 
Parliament. An institution that in his opinion was required to be understood as 
the joining of three bodies; the Queen, the House of Lords and the House of 
Commons[259] Understood in that manner, Parliamentary Sovereignty - and not 
simply its mere supremacy - was, from the juridical perspective 'the dominant 
characteristic of British political institutions'[260]  
  
The principle of the sovereignty of parliament meant that it was in parliament 
where 'the right to do and undo any type of law' resided and that, consequently, 
no person or corporation was authorised by the Law of England 'to annul or 
derogate the legislation of Parliament'[261] However, as for Dicey, faithful to 
positivism, we could only speak of juridical rules when these were capable of 
enforcement by the courts of law[262] the principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty implied that these courts had to accept any Act of Parliament, or 
any part of it that consisted in approving a new law or in derogating a previous 
one whether partially or totally[263] Formulated in a negative sense, from the 
principle that Parliamentary Sovereignty, (the legal and doctrinal antecedents of 
which he deals with[264] Dicey extracts four main premises. The first of these 
being: neither the Queen, nor the House of Lords nor the House of Commons 
could separately be considered sovereign under English constitutional law. Only 
a rule jointly approved by these three bodies could be considered law and, 
accordingly, be obeyed as such by the other public powers and, specially, by 
the courts[265] In particular Dicey held that the Queen could not appeal to her 
prerogative to suspend or derogate a law approved by Parliament, while 
Parliament was empowered by law to diminish the powers of the regal 
prerogative. Both questions that in the past had led to many disputes, but that 
no longer held any interest[266]  
  
Secondly Dicey held that the people (despite what Locke had argued) or even 
better, the electoral body (as Bentham had preferred to refer to), was not an 
absolute sovereign in Great Britain. According to Dicey the only right that 
electors had under the English Constitution was to elect the members of 
Parliament. Electors lacked any entitlement to initiate, sanction or reject the 
legislation of the Parliament. No Court will for one moment consider the 
argument that a law is invalid for being contrary to the opinion of the electorate, 
who can only express itself juridically through Parliament and in no other 
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manner[267] In this respect he also differed from Austin who, in Dicey's 
judgement, had not considered anything else other than 'juridical sovereignty' 
and another distinctive, 'political sovereignty'. The first belonged in Great Britain 
only to the Queen together with the Houses of Parliament. The second, at least 
during the 19th century, was exercised by the people or, with greater juridical 
precision, that section of the people capacitated by the system to form part of 
the electorate. Politically it could be said that the people or the electorate was 
sovereign in Great Britain, given that its will was that which the Queen made 
hers in Parliament. A Queen whose powers had been considerably curtailed as 
a result of the advances of the Cabinet System, as Walter Bagehot -somewhat 
exaggerating this curtailment - had highlighted in an entertaining and greatly 
influential book published some two decades prior to Dicey's.[268] But juridically 
the will of the electorate could not be argued absolutely before the Courts of 
Justice, at least while Parliament didn't declare this to be its will. Dicey pointed 
out that the political sense of the word 'sovereignty' was as important - if not 
more - than its juridical meaning. But the two meanings, although closely 
connected, were essentially distinct and in some part of his work Austin had 
confused them 1/4. No English judge would agree in considering Parliament, in 
its juridical sense, as a trustee of the electorate.[269]  
  
Thirdly, Dicey held, with no less emphasis, that there was no contradiction 
between the judicial creation of law and Parliamentary sovereignty. Without 
doubt judges in England, in addition to applying the law also created it, their 
sentences conforming with a repertoire of precedents to which they were bound 
in order to resolve similar cases with which they were faced in the future.  
 
However, once again agreeing with Hobbes, Bentham and Austin, and openly 
against Coke and even Locke, Dicey held that case law was always subordinate 
to the legislation of the Parliament[270] A thesis that made him hold that the 
laws of parliament approved by the required formalities, could not be declared 
invalid by the Courts when these considered them contrary to moral principles 
or international law[271] Such thesis, however, did not imply in any way to 
disregard the importance of case law, through which the common law was 
updated, but it also interpreted statute law, that is, the laws approved by 
parliament. The latter law being one to which both the executive and the 
citizenship were subordinate and without any room for a 'droit administratif' nor 
for any administrative jurisdiction. All of this in accordance with the 'rule of law' 
the other great principle of English Constitutional Law, Dicey dedicating a whole 
chapter to its relationship with Parliamentary sovereignty[272]  
 
Fourthly and lastly, Dicey affirmed that the Parliament could not limit 
subsequent Parliaments, so that no law could be considered beyond reform[273] 
On the contrary, the doctrine of the legislative supremacy of Parliament was 'the 
very keystone of the law of the constitution'[274] This premise made him outline, 
in a very acute and brilliant manner, the link between the sovereignty of 
parliament and what his friend and colleague Lord Bryce had called the 
'flexibility' of the British Constitution, or expressed in another way, between the 
sovereignty of Parliament and the non-existence of a rigid constitutional text 
and superior to the law, that - on the other hand - existed in the United States of 
America, a country in which the supremacy of the Constitution over the law had 
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been constructed parting from Locke's theses of the sovereignty of the people 
(the ultimate expression of which was the Constitution, fruit of its constituting 
power) whilst the consequent constitutional control of the law through the 
means of judicial review, apart from being a requirement of the federal principle, 
sank its doctrinal roots in the judicial tradition that the common law judges, with 
Coke at its helm, had created against the absolutism of the Stuarts and that 
Locke himself had made his in his 'Second Treatise on Civil Government'.[275]  
 
Dicey pointed out that by virtue of its sovereignty, repeating what Blackstone 
and Paley had said previously, the Parliament of England could modify any law 
independently of its political importance, without the need to observe any 
special process. In reality there was no juridical distinction in England between 
constitutional and ordinary law. The consequence of this was that there was no 
authority in England with the right to annul a law of the Parliament alleging its 
Unconstitutionality.[276] Dicey concluded that England had laws that could be 
called fundamental or constitutional in the sense that they regulate matters of 
importance (for example, the succession of the Crown or the terms of the Union 
with Scotland) floating over the institutions. But there was no supreme law or 
one which could be used to verify the validity of the other laws. The first 
fundamental dogma of English Constitutional law was the absolute legislative 
sovereignty or the despotism of the King in parliament.[277]  
  
As it was previously advanced, Dicey's observations regarding sovereignty have 
exercised an enormous influence during the 20th century[278] whose doctrine 
continued to consider the sovereignty of Parliament - not that of the people - as 
the dominant characteristic of the British Constitution (Sir Ivor Jennings)[279] or 
HL Hart's rule of recognising the British juridical system[280] or Geoffrey 
Marshall's ground norms of the system[281] However and as Colin R. Munro 
recognises[282] although Dicey's doctrine on sovereignty represents still today - 
at the doorstep of the 21st century - an unavoidable starting point, it is no less 
true that the most outstanding writers of this century have been highly critical of 
the consequences that Dicey extracted from his doctrine on sovereignty. 
Reason why there has been talk of a 'new perspective' of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, including among many Sir Ivor Jennings, E.C.S. Wade and G. 
Marshall[283]  
 
Marshall, distancing himself from Dicey's rather rigid criteria, holds that it would 
conform with British law that in future Parliament could limit itself by means of a 
Bill of Rights, something which British doctrine has been demanding over the 
past twenty years, approved by a very qualified majority or by means of a 
referendum, so that the Courts of Law could consider invalid - being ultra vires, 
any subsequent law that contradicted this Bill of Rights unless this law was 
approved by an identical majority or approved by referendum by the electoral 
body[284] On the other hand, there is no doubt that during the current century 
the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty has had to face new and very difficult 
challenges. Particularly three: firstly that faced by the 1937 Statute of 
Westminster which compelled the reconsideration of the relationship between 
the British parliament and the Commonwealth[285] secondly that caused by 
Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1972, which put on the 
table the no less problematic relationship between the sovereignty of the British 
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Parliament and the primacy of European Community Law[286] thirdly that 
implied by the approval in 1997 of the Autonomy polls in Wales and Scotland, 
which have compelled a redefinition of the role of the Parliament of Westminster 
and its relationship with the two new legislative assemblies[287] Such 
challenges have forced a reconsideration of the validity of Parliamentary 
sovereignty in Great Britain today[288] where the debate regarding sovereignty 
has acquired great political importance and substantial academic interest, as it 
may be appropriate to outline on another occasion.  
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